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5
Key messages
1. Incentives for Water Security
Watersheds are the appropriate units for water management
A watershed is the area of land that feeds water into a river, through the process of precipitation 
draining through the landscape, into tributaries and into the main river channel. Watersheds are also 
called ‘catchments’, ‘drainage basins’ or ‘river basins’. 
Watershed services benefit people and nature
The various components that make up the landscape within a watershed – for example forests, grass-
lands, cultivated areas, riparian areas and wetlands – form groups of ecosystems. These ecosystems 
provide ‘watershed services’. These are defined as the benefits obtained from the ecosystems within 
a watershed that support downstream water users, including ecosystems.
Payment for watershed services is an important innovation in water management
Watershed services are key in creating water security for downstream water users. Providing incen-
tives by paying land and water managers to maintain watershed services is an innovative way of 
strengthening water security. A wide variety of cases now exist around the world from which we 
can draw lessons of the do’s and don’ts relating to payment schemes for watershed services.
2. Valuing and Managing Watershed Services
Linking upstream land and water use and downstream benefits
For a payment scheme to succeed and endure, the actions and change brought about by upstream 
land and water managers should result in identifiable benefits for downstream water users. 
Therefore, clear cause-and-effect relationships between upstream land and water use practices and 
the provision of watershed services for downstream users needs to be identified. The degree to 
which this is possible varies considerably from case to case.
Using indicators and targets to define service baselines and track progress
Watershed services are controlled by an ‘optimal mix and intensity’ of land and water use in water-
sheds. It is important to define and quantify indicators to track the delivery of watershed services 
to benefit specific users. These indicators and targets need to relate directly to measurable land 
and water use variables and should be agreed upon by the stakeholders involved. Planning for new 
or improved data collection on a limited set of key indicators and targets may be needed as part of 
the scheme.
Focus investments on agreed actions and locations
It is important to define clearly the goals of the payment scheme based on the causal links established 
between upstream actions and downstream benefits. Clear goals help to define which locations will 
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be targeted for specified interventions. It also helps to narrow down the group of stakeholders to 
be involved in the scheme and the mechanisms to be used. It further creates transparency and trust 
amongst stakeholders in the scheme.
Build a case for investment through valuation of watershed services
The economic valuation of watershed services can be used to raise awareness of the importance of 
these services and create support for a payment scheme. However, the final prices agreed within a 
payment scheme will be determined by the costs and benefits to stakeholders.
Information provision and negotiation among stakeholders are essential
Stakeholders need to be well informed to be able to decide where investments should be made and 
what changes and impacts are sought. One needs to establish clearly which stakeholders can impact 
watershed services (‘sellers’) and which stakeholders can benefit from watershed services (‘buyers’). 
Evidence that relates changes in land and water to levels of watershed services forms an important 
basis for bringing potential buyers and sellers together.
3. Designing a Payment Scheme
Making watershed services in everyone’s interest
With the right ingredients, good design and effective agreements, a payment scheme makes restora-
tion or maintenance of watershed services beneficial to all parties. Looking after watershed services 
then becomes in everyone’s interest, instead of only those threatened by or suffering from the 
impacts of degradation. The fundamental basis for this shift is the introduction of values for water-
shed services and linking those values to markets where these services are exchanged.
Creating markets helps to internalize costs perceived as externalities
Payment schemes internalize externalities by creating market mechanisms for exchanging watershed 
services delivered by upstream sellers for payment by downstream beneficiaries. If well-designed, 
payment schemes can be a cost-effective and efficient way of influencing choice and behaviour in 
land and water management throughout a watershed. They can help to increase the awareness 
among stakeholders of the value of watershed services, encouraging them to make better use of the 
resources available in order to increase water security.
Understanding the marketplace for watershed services
To establish a market for watershed services, there must be recognition of the goods and services 
provided by the mix of ecosystems in the watershed as assets. There must be recognition that these 
assets can be traded and that a price for them can be agreed. Buyers and sellers of watershed services 
who are willing to consider entering a potential scheme should be identified. Property, access and 
use rights relating to land tenure and water resources should be clearly established. 
There are a range of options for payment schemes 
Different types of payments schemes are possible. A private scheme involves direct payment to ser-
vice providers, the purchase of land or the sharing of costs among involved private parties. A cap-
and-trade scheme establishes a cap for water abstraction or pollution and enables trading of permits 
among water users. With a certification or eco-labelling scheme, costs of services are included in 
the price paid for a traded product. Finally, public payment schemes, the most common schemes, 
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involve public agencies and include user fees, land purchase and granting of rights to use land 
resources, as well as fiscal mechanisms based on taxes and subsidies.
Carefully evaluate the options to find the best fit
For any payment scheme for watershed services, the objectives should be clearly stated and the 
potential economic, social, health and environmental impacts should be assessed. The advantages 
and disadvantages of various options for schemes need to be compared. Also their suitability should 
be defined given the social, economic and political context of the scheme. Stakeholders should be 
informed about and involved in the evaluation of the various options.
Identify financing needs and options for mobilizing funds
Establishing a payment scheme involves not only a financial transfer between service buyers and 
sellers. Additional costs and transfers need to be included, such as for research and development, 
training and awareness activities, coordination and administration, monitoring and impact studies, 
legal fees, inflation and contingencies. Mechanisms for long-term financing of a scheme to cover 
these costs needs to be identified. 
4. Roadmap towards Agreement
Establishing a payment scheme requires buyers and sellers to negotiate
Negotiations among buyers and sellers of watershed services can take many years. To complete these 
negotiations successfully, facilitators and stakeholders have to develop a shared understanding of 
the diverse interests, assets, capacities and power of the players. The aim should be the formation of 
an agreement that specifies the design and rules for operating a payment scheme that is effective, 
efficient, enforceable, transparent, equitable and sustainable.
Getting the right parties involved early on
Identify who needs to be involved in negotiation of the payment scheme and gauge their interest 
through effective communications at an early stage. Aim to have an intermediary act as an honest 
broker, for example from local NGOs, community groups or government agencies. Involve potential 
service buyers who use watershed services either directly or indirectly, not forgetting provision for 
the environment itself. Invite those potential service sellers able to provide the most impact given the 
amount of financing likely to be available. Identify the specialist support needed at various stages of 
the negotiations process including hydrologists, ecologists, land user planners, bankers or lawyers.
Carry out targeted analysis to support negotiations
Use stakeholder analysis to guide negotiations towards agreements that will be institutionally fea-
sible and socially and politically acceptable. Use institutional analysis to help negotiators decide 
which institutions need to be involved in a payment scheme, what roles are appropriate and where 
new institutions are needed to fill gaps. Assess the relative influence and control over watershed 
management of different stakeholder groups using power analysis. Ensure that the interests of key 
stakeholders with little power are protected during negotiations.
Use a range of opportunities to start or advance deal making
Numerous opportunities will arise that can help progress towards an agreement. Opportunities can 
arise from changes in policies, allowing stakeholders to discuss their implications. Also new informa-
tion might become available related to watershed services of direct relevance to some or all parties. 
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Tensions, conflict or a crisis might occur that bring parties together and enable them to find new 
ways to further their discussions. Also a new (local) political leader or champion can appear or be 
found who can catalyse the parties to sit together and work towards agreement.
5. Rules at Work
Clear and enforceable rules and transaction mechanisms are essential
Payment schemes for watershed services need clear and enforceable rules and transaction mecha-
nisms to operate successfully. All parties understand and agree to these rules and mechanisms. A 
failure to establish appropriate rules and transaction mechanisms is likely to erode trust and confi-
dence among stakeholders. 
Design an institutional framework for the chosen scheme
The key ingredients are effective institutions, reliable contract law, enabled by good governance, 
capacity for transaction governance and credible enforcement. Hence, setting the rules for payment 
schemes demands design of an institutional framework for the scheme. This includes the clarification 
of rights, agreement of obligations among parties, establishment of contractual arrangements and 
mechanisms for ensuring compliance and enforcement.
 
Well-defined land and resource tenure are at the foundation of payment schemes
Tenure issues need to be taken into account for property rights to effectively support a payment 
scheme for watershed services. Hence, property rights must provide for more than the regulation 
of land ownership and include the natural resources that the land provides. Ensuring that property 
rights are clearly designated, whether through formal or customary law, is essential if payment 
schemes are to result in the anticipated incentives for watershed management. Effective registration 
and administration of tenure rights is an instrument for clarifying rights among stakeholders.
Define and establish mechanisms for assessing compliance
Clear specification of a payment scheme indirectly describes what constitutes compliance. 
Nevertheless, how compliance will be determined and monitored needs to be stipulated. Compliance 
can be assessed through field inspections, in which case the methods and procedures used, the 
institutions involved and other important details must be defined. Compliance can also be assessed 
through desk reviews, by screening reports prepared on the basis of self-monitoring and record-
keeping by service sellers and buyers using agreed procedures. There should be clear designation of 
responsibilities for proving compliance, and agreed sanctions in cases of non-compliance.
6. Learning from Experience in Partnerships
Sound project management is vital
When developing and running a payment scheme, there must be effective coordination among com-
ponents. Expertise from a range of disciplines needs to be brought together and integrated. This 
requires team-work and good communications among project staff, experts and stakeholders. This 
task should not be overlooked or down-played, as it can make or break a payment scheme. A solid 
project manager with excellent communications skills is therefore required to run the scheme.
9
Establish an effective and transparent social learning process
A social learning process must enable meaningful and well-informed participation by stakehold-
ers in setting up and running the payment scheme. Scoping, situation analysis, scenario analysis and 
feasibility studies are early opportunities to engage stakeholders in social learning. Monitoring and 
evaluating the results and impacts of a scheme enable use of hard data to inform participants about 
whether the scheme is achieving what it set out to do. This enables stakeholders to truly reflect on 
the scheme’s achievements and effectiveness. However, seeing evidence at the impact level may take 
many years. 
Carefully assess the effectiveness and acceptance of a scheme
Payment schemes for watershed services demand careful assessment of how useful and accept-
able they are to stakeholders. Payments for watershed services are an innovative way of providing 
incentives for watershed management, but they are rapidly developing into a mainstream tool. More 
people need to become aware of how to develop and run these schemes. Social learning will remain 
a critical aspect of developing successful payments schemes in the future.
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Preface
Water as a good, a service or a right, is more and more frequently put forward as a major chal-
lenge in our globalized world. We are putting our water resources under increasing pressure and 
we need to address how we deal with this extra stress on our environment. When we add our desire 
for social equity, economic yield and environmental accountability – the problem becomes extremely 
complex. 
To pay or to compensate for environmental services – how to do this and who has to do it – is not 
yet fully incorporated into the present models of water management. Today we urgently need new 
and innovative ideas, tools and ways of working to finance the protection of our water resources. 
We need to obtain positive, sustainable results which guarantee effective, environmental manage-
ment of water supplies.
This guide attempts to define a roadmap for the creation of economic mechanisms and tools 
that relate development to conservation, agricultural and industrial production, and the increasing 
urbanization of our landscapes. 
The search for integrated water resources management is dependant upon the integration of 
all water users and their needs. This requires their active participation in decision-making based on 
the co-responsibility and shared aims for the use of resources. Involvement of stakeholders is a fun-
damental prerequisite and crucial for successfully implementing a payment scheme which finances 
responsible water management. We hope that this publication is a useful guide for those considering 
payment schemes. We all need to become involved in such an endeavour, not only in defining the 
problems but also in implementing the solutions.
Pablo Lloret
Foundation for the Protection of Water (FONAG)
Ecuador
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C h a p t e r  1
Incentives for Water Security
People use the services provided by businesses and government, family, friends and communities 
in their daily lives. They also use services provided by the ecosystems around them. Often the latter 
are not recognised until the moment they cease to exist. For example, once barren and eroded hill 
slopes rapidly discharge sediment loaded water downstream and then it is usually too late to reverse 
the damage. Silted up reservoirs and irrigation channels then become a major constraint on securing 
water supplies. Often it will be very costly to reverse and restore watershed services that used to 
buffer water flows. Watersheds and the services they provide are essential concepts underpinning 
the creation of incentives for people to invest in watershed services and to better contribute to 
water security downstream.
1.1 Understanding watershed services
A watershed is the area of land that feeds water to a river, through the process of precipitation 
draining through the landscape, into tributaries and into the main river channel. Watersheds are 
also called ‘catchments’, ‘drainage basins’ or ‘river basins’. All of these terms are essentially inter-
changeable though they are sometimes applied to different scales. Thus ‘river basin’ is usually used 
to describe a watershed covering a large area of land that drains into a major river, while ‘sub-catch-
ments’ or ‘micro-catchments’ are much smaller parts of a basin that drain into a tributary stream. 
Within a watershed, the quality, quantity and timing of water draining into and flowing 
along rivers is modified by topography, geology, soil type, vegetation cover, land use and 
other human activities. Along the way, water is lost – primarily via evaporation from lakes, 
wetlands, the soil surface and wet vegetation, and through transpiration by plants and trees. 
Water moving down slopes and stream channels, as well as underground, may carry sediment, 
nutrients and other chemicals or contaminants. The quality and quantity of water available 
to downstream users in a watershed thus depends on the particular types and distribution of 
vegetation, the underlying geology, the soil types present and the way that land is used and 
managed.
“WATERSHED SERVICES: THE BENEFITS PEOPLE OBTAIN FROM 
ECOSYSTEMS IN A WATERSHED.”
As a watershed determines waterflows, it is an appropriate area for organizing the planning and 
management of water resources. The condition of a watershed, and the management of the vegeta-
tion cover, the soils and land resources together with the waterways within it, are therefore integral 
to planning water allocation and use. Watershed management needs to be at the heart of strategies 
for securing water supplies and ensuring adequate flow regimes in the river for downstream water 
users. Those downstream water users, such as irrigators, hydropower operators, municipalities, indus-
tries and nature conservationists need to work out together how water can best be allocated.1
The various components making up the landscape within a watershed form groups of eco-
systems. They include, for example, forests, grasslands, cultivated areas, riparian areas and wetlands. 
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These ecosystems support plant and animal biodiversity, but also provide goods and services that 
support human welfare (see Figure 1.1). Examples of water-related goods and services provided 
by ecosystems in a watershed are shown in Table 1.1. These are watershed services: the benefits 
people obtain from ecosystems within a watershed.2 Changing the mix of ecosystems and their 
coverage will change the watershed services provided. The waterflows in a watershed, and hence 
the timing and availability of water downstream, depends on the vegetation cover in the catchment 
upstream. As ecosystems within a watershed are changed, lost or degraded, their capacity to deliver 
watershed services to satisfy human needs is changed.
Table 1.1 The main water-related services provided by ecosystems in a typical watershed
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Provisioning services
Services focused on directly supplying food and 
non-food products from water flows
•    Freshwater supply
•    Crop and fruit production
•    Livestock production
•    Fish production
•    Timber and building materials supply
•    Medicines
•    Hydroelectric power
Supporting services
Services provided to support habitats and 
ecosystem functioning
• Wildlife habitat
• Flow regime required to maintain downstream 
habitat and uses
Cultural and amenity services
Services related to recreation and human 
inspiration
• Aquatic recreation
• Landscape aesthetics
• Cultural heritage and identity
• Artistic and spiritual inspiration
Regulating services
Services related to regulating flows or reducing 
hazards related to water flows
•  Regulation of hydrological flows (buffer runoff, 
soil water infiltration, groundwater recharge, 
maintenance of base flows)
•  Natural hazard mitigation (e.g. flood prevention, 
peak flow reduction, landslide reduction)
•  Soil protection and control of erosion and sedi-
mentation
• Control of surface and groundwater quality
1.2 Why are watershed services important?
The ecosystems that provide watershed services form part of the infrastructure needed for water 
security. In practical terms, water security implies several important considerations. Water supplies 
need to be secured for specific uses such as drinking water, agriculture, industry, transport or down-
stream ecosystems. On the other hand, it implies reducing water based hazards and risks related to 
floods, droughts or pollution. Groups of ecosystems in a watershed, such as forests or wetlands, are 
increasingly recognised for the role they can play in contributing to water security.
With increasing recognition of the contribution of watershed services to water security, more 
and more emphasis has been placed on determining the value of these services.3 Also people have 
started to realize that they need to invest in the maintenance of watershed services, just  as they 
invest in the maintenance of other types of infrastructure. Without such investments, specific water-
shed services that are beneficial to downstream users are likely to be degraded.
Figure 1.1 The main functions and services of a typical watershed.
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Though people increasingly realize that their water security can be influenced by the manage-
ment regime in their watershed, they are often ill-equipped to translate this into actions on the 
ground. Payment for watershed services is an important innovation in water management to address 
this problem. It uses an incentives-based approach for maintaining watershed services that are critical 
for water security. Over the last decades, a range of pilot schemes have been developed. Often these 
have used different ‘banners’ such as Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES), water banks, water trad-
ing schemes or water subsidies. Increasingly, information is now available about the do’s and don’ts 
of setting up and managing these schemes.
“PEOPLE NEED TO INVEST IN WATERSHED SERVICES.”
PAY responds to the demand for more synthesised, practical information on establishing and 
running payment schemes for watershed services. This demand is expressed by potential buyers and 
sellers of watershed services, as well intermediaries who often facilitate the setting up and running 
of payment schemes. The aim of PAY is to assist these parties in designing schemes that are effective, 
efficient, sustainable and equitable. PAY provides an overview of the various components that must 
be brought together to establish a payment scheme for watershed services. A number of critical 
issues are addressed in the various chapters, as summarised in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2 Components that must be brought together during development of a payment scheme 
for watershed services. Numbering refers to Sections in Chapters 2-6 discussing each component
 
First of all, PAY clarifies what watershed services are, how to measure them and how to put a 
value on them. It also explains why it is vital to establish a clear causal link between improving or 
avoiding degradation of a watershed service and direct outcomes related to water security. Without 
this link, a payment scheme is unlikely to galvanize wide support from potential buyers.
Secondly, PAY distinguishes a range of payment schemes for watershed services. Understanding 
the various mechanisms, their pros and cons as well as their ‘basic mechanics’, is important for 
18
PROJECT COORDINATION & SOCIAL LEARNING (6.1, 6.2)
Identifying & Valuing
Watershed Services
• Identification of 
services (2.1)
• Valuation of 
 services (2.2)
Designing the 
Payment Scheme
• Define objectives 
& baseline (3.3.2)
• Assess scheme 
type & design 
(3.3.3)
• Sustainable 
 finance strategy 
(3.4)
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for stakeholder 
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(4.2)
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technical support 
needs (4.2.2)
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Photo 1.1 Clean water in rivers downstream depends on the delivery of upstream watershed services
(Quito, Ecuador).
selecting a specific approach for a particular situation. It further explains the viewpoints of both 
buyers and sellers of watershed services. Finding a bridge between these two perspectives is crucial 
for establishing a payment scheme.
Following this, PAY defines how to bring buyers and sellers together. Understanding the 
policy, institutional and legal context is critical in this regard. PAY explains how, based on sound 
stakeholder analysis, the right selection of stakeholders can be made from the start of developing 
a scheme. 
“PAYMENT FOR WATERSHED SERVICES  IS AN IMPORTANT 
INNOVATION IN WATER MANAGEMENT.”
PAY then defines the range of policy and legal issues involved in establishing and running a pay-
ment scheme for watershed services. Key ingredients of payment schemes are effective institutions 
and a reliable contract law or clear customary law. These should be enabled by good governance, 
effective capacities for governance of transactions and credible enforcement. PAY shows how 
the clarification of rights, agreement of obligations among parties, establishment of contractual 
arrangements and mechanisms for ensuring compliance and enforcement all form part of a success-
ful scheme. 
Finally, PAY explains what is needed to keep a payment scheme together over longer periods of 
time. Monitoring, evaluating, learning and updating the scheme are all critical parts of the sustain-
ability of a successful scheme. 
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C h a p t e r  2
Valuing and Managing Watershed Services
Understanding connections is critical to developing payment schemes for watershed services. 
Payment schemes have to link watershed management to downstream impacts, and therefore the inter-
ests and motivations of upstream and downstream stakeholders. Values for watershed services have to 
be linked to decision-making in watersheds. There are key issues that must be understood before these 
connections can be used to construct a payment scheme. How does watershed management relate to 
sustainable use of watershed services, and how can the condition of watershed services be monitored? 
These are critical questions because identifying the cause-and-effect links between watershed manage-
ment and changes in the delivery of watershed services is a fundamental building block of payment 
schemes. Who are the beneficiaries of watershed services, and who are the suppliers or providers of ser-
vices? Creating economic incentives for watershed management demands that the influence of values 
for watershed services on the choices and behaviour of these stakeholders is understood. Connecting 
watershed management to valuations for watershed services and to decision-making helps to build a 
case for payment schemes. Raising interest, awareness and understanding of these connections is vital 
to ensuring that paying for watershed services can be justified to stakeholders.
2.1 Linking land and water use to downstream benefits 
The relationship between the condition of ecosystems in a watershed and its capacity to provide 
watershed services is fundamental to the concept of payments for watershed services. It is the basis for 
linking the needs and welfare of downstream users of water or aquatic resources to the actions of man-
agers responsible for upstream waterways, vegetation cover, soil use and land management. It is what 
links the economic interests of downstream fishers, irrigators, dam operators and water supply compa-
nies to decision-making by distant upstream farmers, foresters and land-use planners. Recognition of 
the downstream benefits of watershed services is the motivation for trying to influence decision-making 
and management upstream. Schemes supporting payment for watershed services are designed as one 
means of using economic incentives to influence how watersheds are managed. 
“CONNECTING WATERSHED MANAGEMENT TO VALUATIONS 
HELPS TO BUILD A CASE FOR PAYMENT SCHEMES.” 
2.1.1 Watershed management
Indicators for watershed services
In identifying approaches for managing watershed services, a useful question to ask is how much 
of the services needed downstream can be supplied by the watershed? What is the capacity of the 
watershed to meet the demand for services? Capacity for service provision depends on biotic and abi-
otic characteristics of the mix of ecosystems in the watershed. Different ecosystems in the watershed 
(e.g. forests, grasslands, rivers) provide different combinations of services, in different amounts and 
at different times of the year. 
21
“DIFFERENT ECOSYSTEMS PROVIDE DIFFERENT COMBINATIONS 
OF SERVICES.”
The challenge for managers who have to decide on the optimal mix and intensity of land use 
in watersheds is to define and quantify indicators to track the delivery of watershed services (see 
Table 2.1). For example, the capacity of the watershed to provide fish can be measured by maximum 
sustainable harvest levels, the capacity to deliver water throughout the dry season can be tracked 
by hydrological parameters and the attractiveness for recreational use can be monitored by the 
willingness to pay of visitors or potential visitors. It is important to remember, though, that most 
functions and processes in ecosystems are inter-linked. Thus, to be meaningful, indicators of sus-
tainable use of watershed services need to provide information on both the status and the dynamic 
interaction between ecosystem components (e.g. land cover) and processes (e.g. water flow).
In preparing the development of a payment scheme for watershed services, sources of appropri-
ate indicators and data need to be identified. The data needs to be acquired and organized into 
formats useful for the planning, negotiation and monitoring of payment schemes. The type of data 
required is determined by the criteria chosen for allocating payments and monitoring impacts. 
Where the availability or quality of data is inadequate, design of the payment scheme will have to 
include plans for new or improved data collection on a limited set of key indicators and targets.
Photo 2.1 Village led, research discussions on water flows (Thailand).
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Table 2.1 Watershed services and examples of indicators of the state of services and 
sustainable use levels  
Provisioning services
Regulating services
Supporting services
Cultural & amenity services
Watershed services 
Water supply
Food provision
Non-food goods 
Hydroelectric power
Regulation of water 
flows 
Hazard mitigation
Control of soil erosion 
and sedimentation
Water purification 
Wildlife habitat 
Environmental Flows
Aesthetic and 
recreational services
Heritage and  identity
Spiritual and artistic 
inspiration
Service attributes
• Precipitation, infiltration, soil water 
retention, percolation, 
 streamflow, groundwater flow
• Biotic and abiotic effects on water 
quality 
• Crop, fruit and livestock 
 production
• Edible plants and animals 
 (e.g. fish, algae, invertebrates)
• Production of raw materials 
 (e.g. timber, reeds)
• Production of medicines 
• Flow for energy generation
• Retention of rainfall and release 
(especially by forests and wetlands) 
• Water storage by rivers, lakes and 
wetlands
• Groundwater recharge and 
 discharge
• Reduced flood peaks and storm 
damage
• Coastal protection
• Slope stability
• Protection of soil by vegetation and 
soil biota 
• Reduced siltation of streams and 
lakes
• Nutrient uptake and release by eco-
systems
• Removal or breakdown of organic 
matter, salts and pollutants.
• Wildlife and nursery habitats 
• Maintenance of river flow regime 
• Landscape quality and features 
• Landscape features or species 
• Inspirational value of landscape 
features and species
State indicator
• Water storage capacity (m3/m2)
• Pollutant concentrations
• Agricultural water use (m3/ha)
• Fish stock (kg/m3)
• Amounts available (kg/ha/year)
 
• Storage capacity of riverbeds and 
lakes (m3/km2)
• Slope (deg), elevation (m)
• Infiltration capacity (mm/h)
• Water storage capacity of  soils
 (m3/m3) 
• Maximum natural water storage 
capacity (m3/m2)
• Infiltration capacity (mm/h)
• Slope length (m)
• Barren land (%)
• Nitrogen amount (kg/ha)
• Total dissolved solids (kg/m3)
• Electric conductivity (µS/cm)
• Resident and endemic species 
(number) 
• Surface area per ecosystem type (ha)
• Area of critical habitats (ha)
• Discharge for each season (m3/day)
• Stated appreciation
• Recreational value (e.g. entrance 
fees (US$/visit)
• Cultural significance and sense of 
belonging 
• Books and paintings using water-
shed as inspiration 
Sustainable use indicator
• Discharge (m3/year)
• Maximum sustainable water use for 
irrigation (m3/year)
• Net Productivity (kg/ha/year) 
• Maximum sustainable harvest (kg/
ha/year)
• Maximum sustainable energy pro-
duction (kWh/year)
• Baseflow volume (m3/year);
• Size (km2) and economic value 
(US$/km2/year) area protected 
from flooding
• Soil loss (kg/ha/year)
• Sediment storage (kg/ha/year)
• Denitrification (kg/ha/year)
• Increase or decline in species popu-
lation size (number)
 
• Fish species and population 
• Total fish catch (t/year)
• Houses on lakeshore (number/km)   
• Visitors (number/year)
• Visitors (number/year) 
• Pilgrims (number/year)
Relating land use and management to watershed services
Having measures of sustainable-use levels for watershed services does not, however, provide 
enough information to create a payment scheme. Clear targets need to be set for maintaining or 
improving critical indicators. Once defined, these targets provide a simplified description of the 
desired state of the watershed. The payment scheme can then be designed to either maintain or 
restore the target level for a particular indicator. 
“TARGETS ARE A SIMPLIFIED DESCRIPTION OF THE DESIRED STATE 
OF THE WATERSHED.”
To create a payment scheme, there are four key questions:
•	 What	should	be	invested	in?
•	 Where	should	investments	be	made?
•	 How	much	should	be	invested?
•	 Who	should	be	investing?
Answers to the last two questions are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. To decide what 
to invest in and where, knowledge is needed about how the quantity, quality, timing and duration 
of watershed services responds to changes in the type of land cover, land use and management 
regimes.
Table 2.2 Simplified relationship between land-cover type and the watershed services they 
provide 5 
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Grasslands
medium +
high +
low +
medium +
medium +
medium +
medium + / -
medium +
medium +
medium +
medium +
medium +
medium +
Forest
 
medium +
low +
high +
low +
low +
low +
high +
low +
low +
high +
low +
low +
high +
Rivers & streams
high +
low +
low +
high +
high +
low +
medium +
low +
high +
high +
high +
high +
high +
Lakes
high +
high +
low +
high +
high +
high +
medium +
low +
high +
high +
high +
high +
high +
Marshes, swamps, 
foodplains
low +
high +
medium +
low +
high +
high +
medium +
high +
high +
high +
low +
low +
low +
Cultivated land
negative
high +
low +
negative
medium +
medium +
negative
negative
medium +
negative
medium +
low +
medium +
Watershed services
Water supply
Food
Non-food goods
Hydropower
Regulation of flow
Hazard mitigation
Control of soil erosion 
& sedimentation
Water purification
Wildlife habitat
Environmental flows
Aesthetic & recre-
ational services
Heritage & identity
Spiritual & artistic
Inspiration
Land cover type
Provisioning
Regulating
Supporting
Cultural and amenity
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Table 2.2 helps to identify what land-use and land-cover types are most favourable to given 
watershed services. Comparing columns in the table indicates how the mix of services available 
shifts as a result of changes in land cover or use. For example, clearing forests to expand the area of 
cultivated land in a watershed will increase the provision of food and some other products but will 
change and often reduce the availability of many other services, such as hazard mitigation, control 
of sediment runoff and wildlife habitat. Payment schemes aiming to maintain a particular water-
shed service or set of services need to create incentives that prevent changes in land cover that will 
degrade service provision. Where schemes aim to restore specific watershed services, they need to 
create incentives that promote change to land uses and management practices that improve provision 
of these services. 
“PAYMENT SCHEMES CREATE INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE 
PROVISION OF SERVICES.”
In the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia, a payment scheme is used to finance restoration of 
natural vegetation as a strategy for controlling dryland salinization (Case 1).
Case 1 Salinity credits used to finance upstream reforestation in the Murray-
Darling Basin, Australia 4
Widespread land clearing for agricultural development in the Murray-Darling Basin has caused salinization 
of soils and irrigation water in many areas, resulting in severe loss of agricultural productivity. Clearing natural 
vegetation means that less water is transferred to the atmosphere, causing the water table to rise and deposit 
mineral salts in the soil and surface waters. Dryland salinity severely affects 40% of private land managers in 
New South Wales, and saline water is estimated to affect 15% of irrigated land, with a further 70 to 80% of 
irrigated land threatened. 
In 1999, State Forest of New South Wales (a government agency), entered into a ‘Pilot Salinity Control 
Agreement’ with Macquarie River Food and Fibre (MRFF), an association of 600 farmers in the Macquarie River 
watershed. The agreement provides financing for tree planting as a cost-effective strategy for reducing 
salinity in river systems. The MRFF purchases salinity credits from State Forests based on water use by restored 
forests in the upper watershed. Farmers pay US$ 45/ha/year. The funds generated are used for restoring natural 
vegetation on public and private land. The aim is to restore 40% of the cleared forest, which is necessary to 
reverse the salinization process. 
In reality, it is not possible to simply replace undesirable characteristics of land cover or manage-
ment with desirable ones. Trade-offs are inevitable. These may be between watershed services, types 
of benefits and different beneficiaries. For example, planting of fast-growing trees in a degraded 
area will increase erosion control and reduce downstream sedimentation, but may also reduce water 
yields. Incomes of land users or employment opportunities may also change. 
It is vital that watershed services included in a payment scheme are selected in close consultation 
with the main stakeholders, and are based on the best available analysis of the potential impacts of 
proposed changes in land-cover type or management. A useful step to support identification of trade-
offs is to describe the various services available from each of the main land-use types or ecosystems 
in the watershed (e.g. grassland, forest, river, wetland, or lake) in detail, and to then map the spatial 
distribution of the ecosystems and the main groups of stakeholders involved. Results from the stake-
holder analysis (Chapter 4) can then be used to understand how the interests of different groups 
may be impacted by proposed changes in land cover and management. 
Information provision and negotiation among stakeholders are essential to deciding where 
investments financed by payment schemes should be made. The information used by stakeholders 
in this process has to enable them to agree on what changes in land use or management need to 
be promoted or avoided by financial incentives. Evidence that relates change to levels of watershed 
services forms an important basis for creating transparency and trust in the effectiveness of a pay-
ment scheme. 
“EVIDENCE OF WATERSHED SERVICES IS IMPORTANT FOR 
TRANSPARENCY AND TRUST.”
For certain land use and land cover types the relationships with downstream water flow regimes 
are well established. For example, soil loss and river sedimentation is reduced in cultivated areas 
by farming systems using zero-tillage or agroforestry compared to cropping systems that leave the 
soil bare for parts of the year. Also it is well established that intact old growth forest provides higher 
water quality.
Thus, there is a well established knowledge base around the link between land use or manage-
ment practices and water quality and sedimentation. 
A more varied picture has emerged around the relationship between forest cover and water 
quantity. Traditionally many have assumed a universal hydrological ‘benefit’ from forests for down-
stream water users. Increasingly, it has been demonstrated that this is not always the case. For exam-
ple, forest cover in arid and semi-arid areas has negative impacts on the dry season flow available 
downstream, as water is ‘lost’ through evapotranspiration. In many cases it is important to establish 
the relationship between forest cover and water yield before starting with the development of a 
payment scheme. Where knowledge is inadequate, payment schemes can be undermined by general-
ized assumptions that can be misleading and result in unintended impacts and unexpected outcomes 
from changes in land use or management (Box 2.1). 
“LOCATION-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS IS CRITICAL FOR SETTING UP 
PAYMENT SCHEMES.”
To make payment schemes for watershed services successful, misunderstandings over relation-
ships between land-use management and watershed services need to be avoided. Careful and 
location-specific analysis of information on watershed services, land use and management practices 
forms a critical step in developing payment schemes. The best available data and up-to-date knowl-
edge of how land cover characteristics change watershed function should be brought together. 
Expert analysis can then provide the evidence base for decisions on actions to be supported by the 
payment scheme and their likely impacts on watershed services. Where there is not sufficient data, 
expert panels can be used to analyse and provide a ‘best estimates’ of likely responses to interven-
tions in land use and management aimed at improving watershed services.
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Box 2.1 The impacts of forests on watershed services
There is a widely-held and persistent idea that retaining forest cover is always a good thing and deforestation 
always a curse for watershed management. This assumption leads, however, to management decisions that 
do not always work out as expected. In some situations, the real impacts of afforestation or forest removal 
can be rather different. For example:
•	 It	came	as	a	great	surprise	to	foresters	in	Fiji	when	it	was	discovered	that	planting	fast-growing	exotic	pine	
trees to boost timber and paper pulp production from otherwise marginally productive, fire-climax grass-
lands more than halved dry season streamflows. Water security for numerous villages situated downstream 
from	the	forest	estate	was	unintentionally	jeopardised	as	a	result.	
•	 Planting	 exotic	 trees	 in	 sub-humid	 parts	 of	 South	Africa	 is	 no	 longer	 considered	 a	merely	 positive	 act	
because of their detrimental effects on water availability. A ‘water tax’ is now being charged if such 
income-generating activities are likely to reduce streamflows. 
•	 Montane	cloud	forests	are	known	for	 their	very	high	water	production	capacity,	which	has	been	tradi-
tionally ascribed to stripping of water by the forest canopy from frequent fog. It was feared therefore 
that clearing of cloud forest would cause streamflows to diminish. Recent evidence from Costa Rica has 
shown, however, that the overall hydrological impact of cloud forest conversion was close to neutral, 
because reduced cloud stripping was more or less balanced by the lower water use of grassland. 
Overcoming assumptions about forest hydrology should not, however, dictate decisions about how forests are 
used in watershed management. Evidence of the relationship between montane cloud forest and streamflow, 
for example, should not be taken to mean that cutting cloud forests has no adverse impacts. Erosion and 
landslide incidence can be expected to increase after conversion, and numerous rare and endemic species 
would be lost. It is critically important, therefore to include all relevant watershed services when assessing the 
impacts	of	change	in	land	cover,	not	just	the	effects	of	forests	on	streamflows.
“BENEFICIARIES OF WATERSHED SERVICES INCLUDE 
DOWNSTREAM ECOSYSTEMS.”
2.1.2 Who are the service providers and who are the beneficiaries?
Watershed services are provided by land and water managers upstream whose decisions, 
either individually or collectively, impact on flow regimes and the quality and quantity of water 
available downstream. The beneficiaries of watershed services are those downstream whose 
interests and livelihoods depend directly or indirectly on the amount of water available and on 
the level of sediments, nutrients or other chemicals in the water. Direct benefits of watershed 
services include, for example, timely availability of high quality water for irrigation or drinking 
water supply. Indirect benefits include the appropriate flow regime to maintain a downstream 
wetland that supports a subsistence, commercial or recreational fishery. Thus, beneficiaries of 
watershed services include downstream ecosystems, and those who use and value those eco-
systems.
When designing a payment scheme for ecosystem services, however, such a general definition 
of service providers and beneficiaries is not adequate. To discover who the relevant upstream and 
downstream stakeholders are, the water-related problem or security issue must be clearly defined. 
Downstream stakeholders must then be identified through analysis of who will have sufficient 
financial interest in particular watershed services to be motivated to pay for their upkeep. Upstream 
stakeholders should be equally carefully identified, to be sure that those who take part in the scheme 
and are eventually paid for managing watershed services are actually able to administer the desired 
controls on the use or management of land and waterways. Upstream service providers must be 
situated in the targeted areas in the watershed and able to implement decisions that will make a 
difference to downstream water quality, quantity and flow regime. 
Scale is a critical issue in linking watershed services and stakeholders, and thus in designing pay-
ment schemes. Downstream beneficiaries may be interested in watershed services that are relevant 
to large areas – for example provision of sufficient water for hydropower generation. Upstream 
managers may, however, operate only on very small areas of land and thus individually have almost 
no influence on the service in question. Design of a payment scheme for watershed services then has 
to include assessment of the costs and benefits and trade-offs relevant to managers working at such 
a scale and to mechanisms for ensuring that sufficient impact is possible through collective action to 
justify payment. For example, using a payment scheme to support maintenance of ecosystem services 
provided by the upper watershed will put restrictions on use of this area by local stakeholders. The 
impacts of these restrictions on local livelihoods have to be assessed when planning potential pay-
ment schemes.
“PAYMENT SCHEMES HAVE TO REFLECT A COLLECTIVE INTEREST 
AND CAPACITY TO PAY.”
Very different scenarios for payment schemes are possible where there are shifts in the 
scales relevant to service providers and beneficiaries. For example, large-scale establishment 
of fast-growing tree plantations for timber and pulp production in areas that do not have 
sufficient rainfall to support evergreen forest has often led to major reductions in annual and 
seasonal streamflow available to downstream users.6 If downstream water users are small-scale 
irrigators or fishers, any payment scheme would have to reflect their collective interest and their 
capacity to pay, and perhaps therefore involve public institutions. Thus, in addition to know-
ing who the upstream and downstream stakeholders are, it is critical to understand how their 
interests and capacity for action relate to the scale of the desired impacts and action needed 
in the watershed. 
2.2 Valuation of watershed services
 
2.2.1 Justifying investment in watershed services
Investments in watershed services must be supported by sound economic and financial analysis. 
Without this analysis, investments are difficult to justify and potential investors are unlikely to be 
motivated to invest sufficiently. Understanding the economic value of watershed services enables 
more informed decision-making on investment and development in watersheds. It helps to ensure 
that decisions are justified in the context of a more complete picture of the values and benefits 
at stake when water services are impacted by change in a watershed. To better understand the 
economic value of watershed services, a range of methods can be used.7 The information derived 
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from such valuation of watershed services helps to determine the true costs and benefits of various 
land uses and trade-offs involved in deciding between them. Making  values for watershed services 
explicit also helps to motivate people to consider these services in decision-making in the first place. 
Failure to recognise these values often leads to under-investment in watershed services at the cost 
of degradation of the entire ecosystem.8 
“INVESTMENTS MUST BE SUPPORTED BY SOUND ECONOMIC AND 
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS.”
Valuation of ecosystem services is based on the concept of Total Economic Value (TEV), which 
has become a widely used framework for looking at the value of ecosystems. Total Economic Value 
is typically disaggregated into two categories use values and non-use values (Figure 2.1). Use value 
is composed of three elements: 
•	 Direct-use value, which is also known as the extractive, consumptive or structural use value, is 
mainly derived from goods that can be extracted, consumed or enjoyed directly. Examples of 
these goods include drinking water, fish and hydropower, as well as recreation activities.
•	 Indirect-use value, which mainly derives from the services that the environment provides, 
including regulation of river flows, flood control and water purification.
•	 Option value, which is the value attached to maintaining the possibility of obtaining benefits 
from ecosystem goods and services at a later date, including from ecosystem services that 
appear to have a low value now, but could have a much higher value in future because of new 
information or knowledge.
Photo 2.2 Downstream fisheries are dependent on quality water derived from upstream watershed services
(Barra de Santiago, El Salvador).
Non-use values, on the other hand, derive from the benefits the environment may provide that 
do not involve using it in any way, whether directly or indirectly, and comprise:
•	 Existence value, which is the value people derive from the knowledge that something exists, 
even if they never plan to use it. Thus people place value on the existence of blue whales or 
pandas, even if they have never seen one and probably never will, as demonstrated by the 
sense of loss people would feel if they ever became extinct.
•	 Bequest value, which is the value derived from the desire to pass on ecosystems to future 
generations.
Figure 2.1 The Total Economic Value of ecosystems 9 
Investment decisions for development projects in intact watersheds have conventionally focused 
only on direct-use values and ignored the other components of TEV. As a result, there are many 
instances where development has ultimately led to the need for restoration of watersheds and water-
shed services at high cost. In the Netherlands for example, where there is a long tradition of draining 
wetlands, dikes have been the preferred choice for managing water and preventing flooding. With 
the protection offered by these dikes, infrastructure, agriculture, housing and industry are now con-
centrated in former wetlands, and the cost of flooding in these areas is therefore very high. However, 
as the cost of restoring lost wetlands is much less than the cost of the infrastructure needed to avoid 
floods, a programme of river restoration has commenced and includes broadening floodplains, (re)
creating water retention areas in natural depressions and (re)opening secondary channels of rivers.10
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TOTAL ECONOMIC VALUE
USE VALUE NON-USE VALUE
DIRECT 
USE VALUE
Resources used 
directly
• Provisioning 
 services (e.g. 
water, fish)
• Cultural & amenity 
services 
 (e.g. recreation)
INDIRECT 
USE VALUE
Resources used 
indirectly
• Regulating services 
(e.g. flood 
 prevention, water 
purification)
BEQUEST 
VALUE
Future generation 
possible use
• ALL services 
 (including 
Supporting 
 services) 
OPTION VALUE
Our future 
possible use
• ALL services 
 (including 
Supporting 
 services) 
EXISTENCE
VALUE
Right of existence
• Supporting services 
(e.g. panda, blue 
whales, wild eagle)
31
“PAYMENT SCHEMES NEED TO RELATE TO THE CHANGES IN THE 
BENEFITS FROM SERVICES.”
Another example of using valuation of watershed services in planning investment decisions 
comes from New York City (Case 2). New options for investment in infrastructure for water filtration 
resulted from better understanding of indirect-use values of the watersheds supplying water to the 
city.
Case 2 Sustainable water management in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds, 
USA11
The Catskills and Delaware watersheds provide New York City’s 9 million residents with 90% of their drinking 
water supply. The watersheds have a population of 77,000 and cover an area of 4,000 km2. Historically, these 
watersheds have supplied high quality water, but in the 1980s concerns about pollution increased. In 1989, 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency initiated a requirement that all surface drinking water sup-
plies had to be filtered. This could be waived if there were existing treatment processes or natural watershed 
services that provided safe water. In 1992, the City of New York decided to invest in protecting watersheds 
rather than new water filtration facilities, which would have cost US$ 6 to 8 billion to build and US$ 300 mil-
lion annually to operate.
The costs of investing in watersheds to maintain and restore natural filtration are much lower. Diverse mecha-
nisms for investment in the watersheds are used. Investment of US$1 to 1.5 billion over 10 years was financed 
by a 9% tax increase on New York City water bills. In comparison, a new filtration plant would have required 
a two-fold increase in water bills. 
Funds	have	been	used	to	finance	a	US$	60	million	trust	fund	for	environmentally	sustainable	projects	in	the	
Catskill watershed. The City has provided US$ 40 million in compensation to cover the additional costs of 
dairy farmers and foresters who adopted best management practices. Foresters who adopted improved forest 
management, such as low impact logging, received additional logging permits for new areas. Forest landowners 
with 20 ha of land or more that agree to commit to a 10-year forest management plan are entitled to an 80% 
reduction in local property tax. The City is also purchasing development rights for sensitive land near reservoirs, 
wetlands and rivers at market price. Farmers and forest landowners are able to enter into 10 to 15-year con-
tracts with US Department of Agriculture to remove environmentally sensitive land from production. 
Incorporating ecosystem services into decisions on watershed management thus changes the 
range of options available, and may also change the choices made. Increasingly, it is being shown 
that options which accommodate sustainable use of multiple ecosystem services are not only more 
ecologically sound but can also be economically more beneficial.12 Investments in watershed develop-
ment and management therefore need to be scaled on the basis of returns measured in terms of TEV. 
Similarly, payment schemes for watershed services need to be related to the changes in the value of 
benefits from the watershed services they are designed to maintain or restore. If these values are 
low, payment may not be justified and a payment scheme may not be an appropriate incentive for 
sustainable management of watershed services. Awareness of the value of watershed services (Table 
2.3) – and the justification for creating incentives – is needed to build understanding and support 
for payment schemes.
Table 2.3 Estimates of economic values of watershed services13 
2.2.2 Methods to determine monetary values 
There are a variety of approaches used for assessing and quantifying the economic value of 
watershed services. There is no best method. The choice depends on the context, types of eco-
system services taken into account and funding available for the assessment. However, selecting the 
approach most suited to a particular assessment should be based on knowledge of the characteristics, 
strengths and limitations of each method. Detailed explanations of the methods and practical case 
studies are provided in the WANI toolkit VALUE.14
Where constraints on the availability of human or financial resources mean that new valuation 
studies are not done, values are sometimes taken from previous studies that focused on a differ-
ent region or time period. However, each decision-making situation is unique, and therefore data 
obtained from one location may not always be applicable in another place. Thus,  caution should 
be used when applying results from elsewhere to approximate the value of a watershed service in 
a specific area.
“VALUATION OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IS AN IMPORTANT TOOL IN 
THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING PAYMENT SCHEMES.”
It is also important to consider the scale at which studies are done. Valuation studies undertaken 
at a small scale (e.g. a small sub-catchment) may underestimate watershed values on a larger scale 
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Service type Service provided  Developed economies  Developing economies 
  (US$/ha/year) (US$/ha/year)
Provisioning services Water for people  45 - 7500 50 - 400 
 Fish/shrimp/crabs  200 6 - 750 
 Agriculture and grazing 40 - 520 3 - 370
 Wildlife (for food) 40 - 520 0.02 - 320 
 Vegetables and fruits 40 - 470 1 - 200 
 Fibre/organic raw material  45 1 - 40
 Medicinal plants  6
 Inorganic raw material  15 - 160 0.1 
Regulating services Water quality control  60 - 6700 20 - 1400 
 Flood mitigation 15 - 5500 2 - 1700
 Groundwater replenishment   10 - 90 
 Erosion control   20 - 120
 Carbon sequestration 130 - 270 2 - 2000
 Microclimate stabilization  10
Supporting services Biodiversity conservation   0.6 - 3600 
Cultural and amenity services Recreation and tourism  230 - 3000 20 - 260 
 Cultural/religious activities 30 - 1800 80 
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(e.g. the entire basin), as not all of the downstream effects are considered. However, the larger the 
scale, the more difficult is the task of assessing the value of watershed services.15 
The Total Economic Value of ecosystems is a very useful instrument for raising awareness of the 
importance of ecosystems to human society and for increasing the acceptability of payment schemes. 
However, to design payment schemes, it is knowledge of the change in benefits to stakeholder 
groups resulting from changes in watershed services that must guide establishment of appropriate 
levels of compensation. 
2.3 Moving from valuation to setting up a payment scheme
2.3.1 Distinguishing valuations from prices
Valuation of ecosystem services is an important tool in the process of developing payment 
schemes. Valuations are used to demonstrate the contribution of watershed services to the local and 
national economy and how payment schemes can be economically beneficial to stakeholders. They 
help to increase awareness of the existing benefits that water-related ecosystems provide to people, 
and thus build support among local stakeholders and politicians for the establishment of payment 
schemes. They also enable a comparison of the economics of payment schemes with other alterna-
tives. 
However, valuations do not determine the prices paid by beneficiaries of watershed services to 
service providers. As in any transaction between contracting parties, prices paid for watershed ser-
vices under payment schemes are the subject of negotiations guided by the interests and preferences 
of the beneficiaries and service providers. 
“PRICES PAID FOR WATERSHED SERVICES ARE THE SUBJECT OF 
NEGOTIATIONS.”
For downstream beneficiaries, the price they are willing to pay will be measured against the 
added cost that would result from a detrimental change in the watershed services supplied from 
upstream. This is the marginal cost downstream of watershed degradation – resulting from loss of 
benefits or the cost of replacing benefits – and it will not be worthwhile for beneficiaries to pay a 
price for watershed services that is any higher. For example, dam operators would not pay more to 
maintain flows in a river than the income they would lose if flows were reduced. Similarly, water 
utilities would not in principle have an incentive to protect a wetland from destruction if it was 
cheaper to obtain the same water purification benefits by building a filtration plant. 
The price upstream service providers are willing to accept is determined by either the added costs 
they must bear to increase service provision, or the income they must forego – the opportunity cost 
– if they elect to give up management practices or changes in land use that degrade watershed ser-
vices. For example, re-vegetating and excluding cattle from streambanks can help to reduce erosion 
and downstream sedimentation of waterways, but will increase costs for ranchers upstream, because 
of re-vegetation works and the need for fencing. A payment scheme offering a price that is lower 
than these costs will not be attractive to ranchers. Similarly, a payment scheme aiming to provide 
an incentive for landowners to retain forest on sloping land will have to offer a price that replaces 
income that would otherwise have been obtained from converting forest to pasture or cropping.
2.3.2 The ingredients of payment schemes
The basic elements of a payment scheme for watershed services are summarised schematically 
in Figure 2.2. Here, upstream land-use and management practices are related – through a series of 
steps and using an array of information and data – to payments from downstream service buyers to 
upstream service providers.
These steps begin with activities (or potential activities) by upstream land users that modify 
hydrological processes controlling water quality, water quantity and the timing of flows. In 
turn, these impact the watershed services available downstream, which affect the welfare of 
individuals and communities and the profitability of industries and business. Where impacts on 
watershed services are negative (e.g. increased pollution) and where regulations do not impose 
controls on upstream activities, downstream stakeholders then need to think of options for 
reducing or counteracting the loss of services they face. They can use valuation studies to com-
pare the costs and benefits of alternate means of restoring or maintaining watershed services. 
They can then identify which potential solutions are most cost effective. If paying upstream 
stakeholders to either apply desired management practices or prevent detrimental change in 
land use proves to be a cost-effective option, then the potential service providers upstream 
need to evaluate the financial profitability of complying. This can be done by comparing the 
net profits generated by alternative land uses or management practices, taking into account 
potential payment schemes. 
The economic and financial studies undertaken by downstream service buyers and upstream 
service providers are used to inform and support the design and negotiations of a payment scheme. 
These studies help to relate the interests and obligations of stakeholders in a payment scheme to real 
costs and profitability. Negotiation between the contracting parties then determines the price paid 
by service buyers to compensate service providers. Economic valuation can thus provide justification 
for investment in watershed services and enable identification of the most profitable options for 
delivering needed services. However, social perceptions, political views and bargaining power play 
a crucial role in complex negotiations among stakeholders over the final prices paid for services. 
Therefore it is critical to disseminate, as widely as possible, available information relating to existing 
linkages between land use and water-based ecosystem services, valuation studies and the economic 
efficiency of undertaking a payment scheme. The aim should be to raise awareness and the interest 
of different stakeholder groups in participating, and to facilitate the decision-making process.
   “SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS, POLITICAL VIEWS AND BARGAINING 
POWER DETERMINE FINAL PRICES FOR SERVICES.” 
During negotiations, agreement is also needed on how to cover the costs of the entire scheme, 
not only the payments between buyers and service providers. Besides the actual payments, there are 
many other costs involved in setting up a payment scheme. The costs for designing and operating 
payment schemes (see Chapter 3) should not be underestimated. Preliminary costs include studies to 
identify watershed services and links with land use, stakeholder consultations, economic valuation 
studies, etc. Transaction costs include attracting buyers and sellers, negotiations, and monitoring 
of compliance. Transaction costs are often significant, especially when high numbers of stakeholders 
are involved.
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Figure 2.2 Payments link upstream and downstream stakeholders in watershed services.
2.4 Checklist: building a case for payment schemes
Link upstream land and water use and downstream benefits
•	 Identify	the	ecosystem	services	most	relevant	to	watershed	management.
•	 Establish	clear	cause-and-effect	 relationships	between	 land	use	and	the	provision	of	water-
shed services. Use up-to-date scientific knowledge and, where needed, expert analysis and 
new data collection.
•	 Assess	trade-offs	expected	in	the	watershed	because	of	changes	in	land-use	or	management.	
•	 Utilize	these	relationships	and	data	to	select	and	prioritize	locations	for	intervention.
Use indicators to define baselines and track progress
•	 Identify	indicators	for	measuring	and	monitoring	watershed	services.
•	 Acquire	and	organize	the	data	needed	to	support	planning,	negotiation	and	management	of	
a payment scheme. 
Understand the needs and capacities of stakeholders
•	 Identify	the	major	stakeholders	in	the	watershed,	including	potential	buyers	and	sellers.	
•	 Compare	the	scale	at	which	watershed	services	are	supplied	and	the	scale	of	action	possible	
by landholders.
•	 Undertake	analysis	of	the	socio-economic	characteristics	and	interests	of	stakeholders,	to	help	
ensure that payment schemes are appropriate to their needs.
Build a case for investment in watershed management
•	 Assess	the	value	of	watershed	services.
•	 Use	information	on	the	values	identified	to	raise	awareness	of	the	importance	of	watershed	
services and create support for the concept of a payment scheme.
Plan what needs to be done to develop a payment scheme
•	 Include:	a	design	phase;	planning	of	sustainable	financing;	negotiation	of	a	fair	price	between	
buyers	and	sellers;	establishment	of	an	enabling	legal	and	institutional	framework;	and	pro-
cesses for building public awareness and leading change.
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C h a p t e r  3
Designing a Payment Scheme 
Payment for watershed services is about creating incentives that influence choices and behaviours 
of upstream land and water managers and downstream water users. With the right ingredients, good 
design and effective agreements, a payment scheme makes restoration or maintenance of watershed 
services beneficial to all parties. Looking after watershed services then becomes in everyone’s interest, 
instead of only those threatened by or suffering the impacts of degradation. The fundamental basis 
for this shift is the linking of values for watershed services to markets where these services are traded. 
Benefits for watershed services that were formerly seen as ‘free’ – and therefore usually overlooked 
in economic decision-making – can then be subjected to the rigours of negotiation and contractual 
agreement.
“PAYMENT SCHEMES ARE AN INNOVATIVE WAY OF  
USING MARKETS TO PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR BETTER 
WATER MANAGEMENT”
A payment scheme for watershed services is an innovative way of using markets to provide incen-
tives for better environmental management.16 Alternatives to market-based approaches include, 
legal, regulatory or social mechanisms that mandate, compel or ban specific practices in uses of 
natural resources. The mechanisms of the market are used to shape decision-making over changes 
in land use and management that are critical to the sustainable use of watersheds. However, the 
market	is	no	more	than	a	tool;	it	is	a	means	to	an	end,	not	the	end	in	itself.	The	goal	is	to	change	
behaviours that damage watersheds, or ensure preferred choices are maintained. Therefore payment 
schemes must be carefully designed to make sure that the incentives they create result in the desired 
impacts on land cover and land and water use. Those leading the development of payment schemes 
need a clear understanding of how markets for watershed services operate, and which options for 
the design of payment schemes are most likely to lead to success. 
3.1 Market-based incentives for watershed management 
3.1.1 Using monetary values to change management choices 
Take an example where forest management activities carried out by upstream landholders 
provide benefits to a community downstream in the form of clean water. This can be the case, for 
example, where reduced-impact logging or excluding grazing animals from a forest result in down-
stream benefits. Without a market to facilitate trading of this benefit for a reward, the stakeholders 
upstream receive no compensation for the services they deliver. The benefits of land-use activities 
that flow downstream are then just side effects that are not reflected in prices paid or income gen-
erated. In the forest management case, the clean water service is in effect, therefore, offered freely. 
Many such watershed services are, as a result, regarded as public goods that are available (to various 
degrees) to all. Services that remain outside markets in this way are said to be externalities.
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The failure of the market to accommodate externalities means that land users lack monetary 
incentives to look after or restore watershed services. In the case of payment schemes, internalizing 
externalities means creating market mechanisms for upstream sellers to exchange services for pay-
ment. Payments are made by the downstream beneficiaries of services. When faced with choices 
between management actions that conserve or degrade watershed services, landholders may then 
have an added interest in pursuing sustainable management because of the income they can gener-
ate. Moreover, the need for beneficiaries to pay for watershed services increases their awareness of 
the value of these services, encouraging them to make better use of the resources available.
Downstream users can use alternative remedial measures such as investing in filtration plants 
or finding other sources of clean water, if they are cheaper than paying for watershed services. If 
well-designed, payment schemes can be a cost-effective and efficient way of influencing choice and 
behaviour in watershed management. 
“PAYMENT SCHEMES CAN BE A COST-EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT 
WAY OF INFLUENCING CHOICE AND BEHAVIOUR”
3.1.2 Understanding the marketplace for watershed services
To develop a market for watershed services, three elements are needed as a starting point:
•	 First,	there	must	be	recognition	of	the	goods	and	services	provided	by	the	mix	of	ecosystems	
in the watershed as assets that can be traded and for which a price can be agreed. 
•	 Second,	 there	must	 be	 buyers	 and	 sellers	 of	 these	 goods	 and	 services.	 Possible	 buyers	 for	
watershed services include stakeholders from both the public and private sectors such as water 
utilities, hydropower operators, municipalities, government agencies, industries or farmer 
associations. Possible service providers or sellers include individual landowners, farmers hold-
ing tenure or property rights and local communities holding communal or common property 
rights. Third parties in the development of markets for watershed services are often interme-
diaries who facilitate the formation of links between buyers and sellers. Intermediaries are 
usually a government agency, an NGO or a commercial broker. 
•	 Third,	it	is	important	to	ensure	that	property,	access	and	use	rights	are	well	established.	This	
relates to land tenure as well as rights for water abstraction and use.
Before watershed services can be exchanged through markets, there must be clear understand-
ing of who manages and delivers watershed services. Although ownership of land can be relatively 
easy to identify, the ownership of the services delivered as a consequence of land use or manage-
ment choices can be difficult to establish. For example, it may be possible to argue that clean 
water is a right belonging to communities downstream. In such a case, those downstream may feel 
entitled to compensation for damage caused to water quality by changes in land use higher in the 
watershed. They are unlikely to agree to pay for watershed services and will instead have to rely on 
regulation of land use and management, backed by the imposition by government of penalties on 
upstream landholders. Payment schemes are sometimes considered a constructive alternative where 
government regulation fails or is unworkable. Changes in behaviour and management choices are 
facilitated through a series of positive incentives instead of threats of penalties that cause resent-
ment between stakeholders
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“CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT ARE FACILITATED THROUGH 
POSITIVE INCENTIVES”
To operate a marketplace for watershed services, and ensure that it is transparent and stable, 
there are additional critical elements:
•	 Motivations	of	buyers	and	sellers	and	their	perceptions	of	risk	need	to	be	understood	to	facili-
tate dialogue and negotiation.
•	 Agreements	must	be	negotiated	between	buyers	and	sellers.
•	 Standards,	 legal	 rights	 and	 capacity	 and	 norms	 for	 governance	 of	 transactions	must	 be	 in	
place, to ensure that contracts for watershed services are enforceable and that there is confi-
dence in the market on all sides.
•	 There	must	be	financial	mechanisms	in	place	that	enable	completion	of	transactions	between	
buyers and sellers.
3.1.3 The logic behind payments 
In principle, markets help to ensure that choices are economically efficient. Payment schemes 
for watershed services are considered efficient when buyers pay less than the costs of alternatives, 
and sellers receive at least as much income as foregone because of compliance with the scheme. 
This is shown schematically in Figure 3.1. Here the payment made under Scenario C is less than the 
expected costs downstream caused by loss of services, but ensures that upstream landholders do not 
lose income. This is the minimum acceptable payment to sellers. In principle, actual payments might 
include a bigger surplus for sellers, depending on the outcome of negotiations with buyers.
The viewpoint of service buyers: willingness to pay
Figure 3.1 shows that service buyers in a payment scheme must carefully evaluate how much it 
is worth paying for watershed services. They should not pay more than the cost of losing services or 
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Figure 3.1 Payments for watershed services are based on assessments of the costs and benefits 
of land and water management for upstream and downstream stakeholder17
of alternatives. Most valuation studies applied to payment schemes therefore estimate the willing-
ness to pay of service buyers, using survey methods. The maximum willingness to pay is an estimate 
of the value of the service and can be considered the upper limit for payment under any potential 
payment scheme. Service buyers must also take into account, however, alternative solutions to loss 
of services, such as using a filtration plant to increase water quality or building a dike to reduce the 
risk of flooding. A payment scheme will, in principle, only be attractive to a buyer if the costs of the 
scheme are lower than the costs of alternative solutions. In the case of poor communities, though, it 
is important to recognise that willingness to pay may actually be lower than this threshold, because 
of lack of capacity to pay. 
The viewpoint of service sellers: no loss of profits 
Service sellers must evaluate the minimum payment needed to make participation in a payment 
scheme worth their while. They should not accept less than the opportunity cost of the scheme. 
This is the profit they would lose as a consequence of the changes in land use and management or 
restrictions on land use needed to comply with the scheme.18 It is assessed by comparing the eco-
nomic returns from land-use activities before and after implementation of the payment scheme. 
For example, landholders need to compare the change in profitability caused by reforestation of 
farmland if that is a condition of payment. Care must be taken to also consider profits foregone 
from potential land uses, as there will be opportunity costs if the payment scheme restricts options 
for land use. Thus, for example, to be attractive to service sellers, payments must make up for profits 
foregone because forests can no longer be converted to farmland, or farmland can no longer be 
developed for housing. The general rule is that payment must be at least equal to the foregone net 
profit of upstream service sellers.
“PAYMENT MUST BE AT LEAST EQUAL TO THE FOREGONE NET 
PROFIT OF UPSTREAM SERVICE SELLERS.”
Room for a deal: acceptance by buyers and sellers 
In principle, a payment scheme deal is only possible, where the willingness to pay of downstream 
buyers is higher than the minimum payment needed by upstream sellers. If this overlap does not exist, 
then buyers and sellers of services will not be able to agree a price that is acceptable to both parties. 
In general, with high opportunity costs upstream and a low value for downstream benefits, it will be 
difficult to establish a payment scheme. However, if the reverse is true and there are low opportunity 
costs upstream and downstream stakeholders have high willingness to pay, then negotiation of a 
price that is acceptable to both parties may be possible. Examples of prices paid in payment schemes 
for watershed services are shown in Table 3.1.
“A DEAL IS POSSIBLE, WHERE THE WILLINGNESS TO 
PAY OF BUYERS IS HIGHER THAN THE MINIMUM PAYMENT 
ACCEPTED BY SELLERS.”
In practice, when developing payment schemes for watershed services, it is important to bear in 
mind that choices and behaviour made by people have many motives. Decisions are not solely deter-
mined by financial incentives. There are consequently many non-monetary rewards and motivations 
that can contribute to the acceptance of payment schemes, such as prestige, public recognition, 
group belonging, avoidance of group sanction and environmental awareness.20 Such motives can 
mean that payment schemes are adopted even if they are not the most profitable or least cost 
choice for a landowner or downstream service user.
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When using valuation data in developing a payment scheme, users also need to be watchful 
for potential biases in estimated values. For example, in a study of three payments schemes used 
for protection of water quality protection in Honduras (Jesus de Hotoro), Nicaragua (San Pedro del 
Norte) and Costa Rica (Heredia), there was evidence that estimates of income foregone by upstream 
landholders were too high. Possible reasons for these discrepancies were that:
•	 Landowners	may	not	report	all	of	their	transactions.	They	may	therefore	overstate	their	prof-
its, the willingness to rent their land and the fair price for engaging in the payment scheme, 
with the aim of obtaining a higher level of compensation.
•	 Farm	 profits	 may	 be	 overstated	 in	 those	 areas	 that	 are	 not	 very	 suitable	 for	 agriculture	
because of, for example, poor soil quality or steep slopes.
•	 Non-economic	benefits	may	be	included	when	estimating	the	value	of	land.	Landowners	may	
give a value to their land that includes not only the income they derive or would derive from 
their land, but also other socio-cultural values such as aesthetic values that are not otherwise 
accounted for.
“DECISIONS ARE NOT SOLELY DETERMINED BY 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES.”
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Table 3.1 Examples of payments made for watershed services19 
Price paid
US$ 45/ha/year
US$ 230/ha/year
US$ 45 - 116/ha/year 
US$ 48/ha/year
US$125/ha/year
US$ 170/ha/year
Activities 
compensated 
Reforestation 
Reduced-input farm 
management
Protecting, sustain-
ably managing and 
replanting forests 
Protecting, sustain-
ably managing and 
replanting forests
Soil conservation 
Watershed 
restoration
 
Watershed 
services provided
• Salinity control 
• Freshwater supply
• Water quality 
control
• Freshwater supply
• Freshwater supply
• Wildlife habitat
• Cultural heritage 
and identity
• Hydropower
• Regulation of 
flows
• Sedimentation 
control
• Soil protection 
• Sedimentation 
control
• Water quality 
 control
• Regulation of flow
• Freshwater supply
• Wildlife habitat
Service buyer
Downstream farmers 
association 
Perrier Vittel (Private 
bottler of mineral 
water)
National Forest 
Office and National 
Fund for Forest 
Financing – 
FONAFIFO 
Energia Global 
(hydropower compa-
ny) and FONAFIFO 
US Department 
of Agriculture 
(Government)
State of Parana 
(government)
Service seller
Government  and 
upstream landowners
Upstream farmers 
Private upstream 
landowners
Private upstream 
land owners
Farmers
Municipalities and 
private landowners
Location 
Murray Darling Basin, 
Australia
Rhine-Meuse Basin, 
France
Costa Rica
Sarapiqui watershed, 
Costa Rica
United States
State of Parana, 
Brazil 
3.2 Types of payment schemes for watershed services 
There are several types of market-based instruments for creating incentives for better environ-
mental management. Four can be distinguished as mechanisms for payment for watershed services. 
These mechanisms are differentiated by the degree of government intervention in administration of 
the schemes and the characteristics of the buyers and sellers. The four types of schemes are:
1. private payment schemes
2. cap-and-trade schemes, under a regulatory cap or floor
3. certification schemes for environmental goods 
4. public payment schemes, including fiscal mechanisms 
In practice, many initiatives are a mix of these approaches, adapted to local needs and context. 
The outlines of each type of scheme that follow are therefore not prescriptions, but are basic frame-
works that can be used as starting points for the process of designing payment schemes.
3.2.1 Private payment schemes
Private payment schemes have the lowest level of government intervention. The term ‘private’ 
refers to ownership characteristics and includes two heterogeneous groups. These are first,   privately-
owned, profit-seeking companies, such as farms and hydropower companies, and secondly, private 
individuals or groups of individuals, for whom profit-seeking is not the primary objective (e.g. con-
sumers). In these schemes, private entities agree amongst themselves to  provide payments or rewards 
in return for maintenance or restoration of a watershed service. The actual transaction mechanisms 
in such schemes can take many forms, of which the most  popular include: 
•	 Transfer payments. These are direct payment schemes. A service seller receives a payment from 
a service buyer in return for the protection or restoration of a watershed service. For example, 
a hydroelectric power company experiencing increasingly irregular water flows may decide 
to pay landowners upstream to change management practices. Here the company assumes 
that a different management practice will improve water supply. Another example of a trans-
fer payment initiative is provided in Case 3. The water utility Empresa Servicios Publicos de 
Heredia (ESPH) raises money from their consumers and clients to support watershed manage-
ment, combining a fiscal mechanism with a transfer payment.
	•	 Land purchases. A private party may decide to purchase land from another private party with 
the aim of safeguarding the watershed services originating from the land in question. Strictly 
speaking, this is a mechanism for payment for watershed services only if the land is purchased 
and then leased back to the former owner under a contract stipulating how the land can 
be used or managed. Case 4 gives an example of such an arrangement developed by Nestlé 
Waters to safeguard sources of bottled mineral water. 
•	 Cost-sharing. Beneficiaries of watershed services can agree among themselves to share the 
costs that must be met by service sellers upstream to maintain or restore watershed services. 
For example, if conversion of natural vegetation upstream is causing deterioration of water 
quality, downstream landowners can agree to share the costs of compensating or rewarding 
upstream landowners for maintaining or establishing preferred land-uses in certain areas.
•	 Purchase of development rights to land. In this type of mechanism, property rights are  sepa-
rated from development rights. A forest owner, for example, may retain the property rights for 
his or her land (i.e. he remains the owner), but he can sell the development rights. The buyer 
and seller then agree in the purchase contract on restrictions on land use and management 
practices that protect watershed services. 
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Case 3 Enhancing surface water quality – a user fee and private payment scheme 
in Heredia, Costa Rica 
Empresa Servicios Publicos de Heredia (ESPH) is a water utility company in the Heredia region of Costa Rica. 
ESPH is a pubic company in which the citizens of the area are also shareholders. ESPH recognised the urgent 
need to protect the water supply and catchment area from risks posed by land use in the upper watershed, 
and determined that paying landowners to manage the watershed sustainably would be more cost effective 
than building a filtration plant. All parties therefore agreed that management costs for conservation of five 
micro-watersheds should be levied as payment for the water quality benefits received. 
Ecosystem services provided: Forest cover maintained in strategic areas of the watershed to help ensure water 
quality downstream, reducing public health risks and costs of chlorination.
Stakeholders involved:
•	 Buyers: Household users and the private sector. Water users in the city of Heredia pay a Tarifa Hidrica to 
ESPH in their monthly water bills. In addition, Florida Ice & Farm, a large soft drink, bottled water and 
brewing company, finances 55% of each contract in the Río Segundo watershed, for conservation of the 
upper watershed areas that supply water to their production facilities.
•	 Sellers: Public (the Braulio Carillo National Park) and private landholders. Participating landowners receive 
a payment close to US$ 110/hectare/year for protecting forests around ESPH’s water sources. This amount 
represents the opportunity cost of land use in the upper watershed. In the case of the national park, the 
Ministry of Environment (MINAE) is paid for conservation and reforestation activities at the rate of US$ 30 
ha/year. 
•	 Intermediaries: ESPH and FONAFIFO (The National Forestry Financing Fund) act as intermediaries in this 
scheme.
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Photo 3.1 A mosaic of productive units in the Mekong basin. Local fisheries and agricultural production depends 
on and determines watershed services (Cambodia).
Payment scheme type: Private transfer payments and user fees. ESPH collects fees from consumers in their 
monthly utility bills. The money collected is equivalent to US$ 0.1/m3, half of which is invested in forest con-
servation and reforestation in three watersheds in the Central Valley of Costa Rica (Rio Segundo, Rio Tibas and 
Rio	Ciruelas);	the	other	half	of	the	funds	raised	are	invested	in	water	infrastructure	and	research.	The	major	
private sector buyer, Florida Ice & Farm, pays its share of contracts directly.
Case 4 Securing aquifers – a private sector payment scheme 
by Nestlé Waters in France 21 
Vittel (a subsidiary of Nestlé Waters) is the world’s largest bottler of natural mineral water. Its most important 
water sources in France are in heavily-farmed watersheds. Runoff of nutrients and pesticides risked con-
taminating the aquifers on which the company’s business depends. The company determined that purchasing 
farmland, reforesting sensitive infiltration zones, and financing farmers to build modern facilities and switch 
to organic farming was in fact more cost effective than building filtration plants. The cost advantages were so 
significant that participating farmers could be offered extremely profitable terms.
Ecosystem services provided: Reduced chemical usage and sustainable land-use management to sustain 
extremely high spring water quality standards.
Stakeholders involved:
•	 Buyers: Vittel, a bottler of natural mineral water. For the first seven years the company spent an average of 
US$ 24.5 million annually.
•	 Sellers: Farmers and landowners. In compensation for reduced use of fertilizer – and hence reduced profit-
ability and higher perceived risk – farmers were given contracts by Vittel for up to 30 years. 
•	 Intermediaries: The government facilitated the deal by providing a small amount of financial aid and a 
strong legal framework to ensure the enforceability of contracts.
Payment scheme type: Private sector payment scheme. Vittel purchased 1500 ha of farmland for US$ 9 million, 
paying more than the market price. Usufruct rights were then granted back to the farmers, giving them the 
legal right to use and derive profit from land owned by Vittel. Farmers receive US$ 230 per hectare annually 
to manage the land using sustainable practices that ensure high water quality standards.
3.2.2 Cap-and-trade schemes
Under a cap-and-trade scheme a cap is established for, say, the release of pollutants or abstraction 
of groundwater. In the case of pollution, the cap is the aggregate maximum amount of pollution that 
can be released by participating entities. Tradeable pollution permits or credits are then allocated by 
dividing up the allowable overall total among polluters. Industries or companies can sell permits that 
they do not need to other participants who need more than their allocation. This rewards companies 
able to cut their pollutant discharge and penalizes those who pollute more heavily, creating an incen-
tive for them to invest in pollution control. Trading increases the economic efficiency of water and 
environmental management, by enabling companies or landholders to buy permits from those able 
to comply in a cheaper way.
“TRADING INCREASES THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF WATER AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT.”
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Three main steps are needed to set up a cap-and-trade scheme. First, the level of the cap must 
be determined. The cap is set either by a government agency or voluntarily, as in cases where large 
companies have established internal trading systems. Second, permits or credits must be allocated 
among resource users or polluters. Third, a market is developed for the exchange of permits and 
credits between buyers and sellers. These types of schemes are applied increasingly to the manage-
ment of groundwater, surface water, wetlands and water quality.22 Case 5 provides an example of a 
cap-and-trade scheme used in the USA to control nutrient pollution of waterways.
Case 5 Controlling nitrogen discharges – a cap-and-trade scheme in the USA23 
The Clean Water Act in the USA limits the level of nutrients allowable in waterways. To comply with the Clean 
Water Act, states have developed strategies to keep nutrient discharges below the total maximum daily load 
allowed under the Act. The Connecticut Nitrogen Exchange Programme is a ‘cap-and-trade’ scheme for nitrogen 
discharges through which entities that discharge less than the nitrogen loads allowable (or ‘capped’) under the 
Act, can sell (or ‘trade’) their nitrogen discharge rights to those who exceed their allowances. This creates a 
financial incentive to diminish nitrogen discharges below allowable limits in order to profit from the sale of those 
discharge rights – while at the same time the scheme ensures an acceptable cap on total discharges. 
Ecosystem services provided: Limit and/or reduce nutrient discharge to waterways in order to maintain or 
improve water quality.
Stakeholders involved:
•	 Buyers: Polluters and the Exchange Programme. Those who discharge more than their permitted nitrogen 
load are required to purchase ‘nitrogen credits’. In the absence of other buyers, the Exchange Programme 
will purchase credits from any permit-holder that discharges less than its allowable load of nitrogen. 
•	 Sellers:	Polluters	who	discharge	less	than	their	allowable	discharge	load.
•	 Intermediaries:	The	Connecticut	Department	of	Environmental	Protection	 through	 its	Nitrogen	Exchange	
Programme, established in cooperation with the state of New York and the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency.
Payment scheme utilized: Cap-and-trade scheme. The federal government set nutrient standards under the 
Clean Water Act which limit total discharges from point sources. A trading system was then implemented at 
the state level to create incentives to diminish nitrogen discharges, and to capture the relative efficiency and 
flexibility of trading schemes over standardized individual compliance requirements.
3.2.3 Certification schemes of environmental goods
Certification or eco-labelling schemes are another payment mechanism for watershed goods and 
services. Transactions occur between private parties, but payment is embedded in the price paid for 
a traded product, such as certified timber, fish or organic produce. The buyers in these schemes are 
consumers who prefer products from suppliers who comply with verifiable environmental standards. 
Intermediaries play a key role in this type of mechanism, either as the certification agency or as trad-
ers in certified products. Examples of eco-labelling schemes include: 
•	 Wood certified by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) to originate from sustainably- 
managed forests.  
•	 ‘Salmon-safe’	products	from	farmers	in	the	northwest	of	the	US	who	undertake	protection	of	
waterways that are important for salmon habitat. 
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Sellers of environmental services under these schemes – the suppliers of certified or eco-labelled 
goods – are compensated through a premium on prices paid by consumers. Payments can be made 
to suppliers as, for example, a fixed sum, a fixed sum per hectare or directly by a price premium on 
products sold. A good example of a certification scheme applied to watershed services is the ‘salmon-
safe’ labelling of farm products in the Pacific Northwest of the United States (Case 6). 
“BUYERS ARE CONSUMERS WHO PREFER CERTIFIED 
PRODUCTS THAT COMPLY WITH ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
QUALITY STANDARDS.”
Case 6 Saving native salmon – a certification scheme in the Pacific Northwest of 
the USA
A successful certification scheme was set up a decade ago to protect the habitat of the Pacific salmon, which 
is native to the Northwest of the United States. The scheme was established by ‘Salmon-Safe’, a non-profit 
organization. Erosion and runoff from hillside vineyards and farms brought silt into streams, which had reduced 
the ability of native salmon to spawn and thrive. Salmon-Safe certifies farms and urban land in watersheds in 
the states of California, Oregon, Idaho and Washington that practise ‘fish-friendly’ management. Salmon-Safe 
has now certified management of 20,000 hectares of land.
Ecosystem services provided: Conservation of habitats used by populations of Pacific salmon, to sustain healthy 
aquatic ecosystems and wild salmon fisheries. 
Stakeholders involved:
•	 Buyers: Consumers in the Pacific Northwest who choose Salmon-Safe products and pay a premium on top 
of the normal retail price to support land management that keeps rivers clean and safe for wild salmon.
• Sellers: Farmers and winegrowers. 
•	 Intermediaries: Salmon-Safe, who oversees the certification scheme and supports the price premium 
through education and marketing campaigns. 
Payment scheme type: Certification scheme. Participating farmers apply ecologically-sustainable agricultural 
practices that protect water quality in rivers and salmon habitats. These practices include tree planting on 
streambanks, growing cover crops to reduce runoff, and application of biological control methods for weeds 
and pests. The extra costs are paid out of the premium that participating growers receive for their products. 
Marketing of these products, including wine and foods, is assisted by public education and awareness cam-
paigns by the Salmon-Safe organization. 
3.2.4 Public payment schemes
Public payment schemes have the highest level of involvement by public agencies and, to date, 
are the most common form of payment scheme for environmental services. Service buyers in public 
schemes are public authorities such as municipalities or national governments who are typically 
motivated by the need to provide safe drinking water or regulation of river flows. Mechanisms for 
payment in these schemes include user fees, land purchase and land easement, which are rights to 
specific use of land owned by others. Case 7 is an example of a public payment scheme designed 
to reduce nitrate leaching to drinking water sources.
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“PUBLIC PAYMENT SCHEMES ARE THE MOST COMMON FORM OF 
PAYMENT SCHEME.”
Case 7 Lowering nitrate levels in water supplies – a public payments scheme in 
the UK
The Nitrate Sensitive Areas (NSA) scheme aimed to reduce or stabilize nitrate levels in key sources of 
public water supply in the UK. The voluntary compensated scheme provided 5-year direct payments from 
government to farmers who adopted management practices that reduced leaching of nitrates from agricultural 
land into vulnerable groundwater. The scheme was applied to about 25,000 hectares using three categories of 
action: 1. the Premium Arable Scheme, which supported conversion of arable land to pasture; 2. Premium 
Grass, supporting lowering of inputs to intensively-managed grassland; and 3. the Basic Scheme for continued 
arable cropping with low nitrogen input. 
Ecosystem services provided: Reduced nitrate leaching into public drinking water supplies, significantly    
contributing to meeting lower nitrate concentrations targets in sources of public drinking water in the UK.
Stakeholders involved:
•	 Buyers: Government. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food directly compensated farmers for 
adhering to the programme’s land-use practices.
•	 Sellers: Farmers. Individual farmers applied to participate in the programme. 
•	 Intermediaries: None. This was a direct public payment scheme.
Payment scheme type: Public payment scheme. The government provided financial aid directly to farmers. 
Payment rates were based on the farmer’s loss of income and costs resulting from changes in agricultural 
practices. As an added incentive, payments were higher than income foregone and costs incurred by an 
estimated	 31%.	 The	majority	 of	 participants	 stated	 that	without	 financial	 aid	 they	would	 not	 continue	 to	
farm using the management practices supported by the scheme because of the increased costs and reduced 
profitability.
Public payment schemes can also use subsidies and taxes to encourage good environmental 
management. Subsidies are positive fiscal instruments used by governments to reward people for 
carrying out specified activities. Within the Common Agriculture Policy, for example, the EU uses 
subsidies to support agro-environmental measures. Thus, more water efficient irrigation infrastruc-
ture, such as drip irrigation, is subsidized with the aim of reducing groundwater abstraction and 
protecting aquifers. 
Environmental taxes can be used to ensure that some or all of the externality costs of land use 
are internalized (or priced into) the decision-making process. They create direct price signals for 
producers and/or consumers. They can be both be used as positive or negative incentives. Taxes can 
be positively used when people are exempted from paying taxes. In the United States, farmers may 
deduct the costs of soil and water conservation from taxable income, limited annually to 25% of 
gross income from farming. Environmental taxes can be used negatively to discourage consumption 
or activities that are detrimental to the environment. In most cases, however, the benefits of envi-
ronmental taxes for the environment are small relative to the size of the problem being addressed. 
Case 8 is an example of the impacts of applying tax to groundwater abstraction. 
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Case 8 Managing groundwater extraction – an environmental tax scheme in the 
Netherlands
In 1995 an environmental tax on groundwater was introduced in the Netherlands. The primary aim of the tax 
was to increase tax revenue. The secondary aim was to alleviate the environmental impacts of groundwater 
abstraction and to encourage lower water consumption. Over-abstraction of groundwater was damaging 
terrestrial ecosystems, but it was cheaper to use groundwater than surface water. The tax on groundwater 
was intended to discourage use of groundwater by making up this difference in cost. Actual environmental 
benefits of the tax were low because the tax was not high enough to make groundwater less profitable to use 
than surface water, and exemptions reduced its effectiveness. Two years after introduction of the tax, water 
consumption was estimated to have declined by between 2 and 12%. 
Ecosystem services provided: Sustainable groundwater usage and terrestrial ecosystem conservation. In this 
case, the groundwater users provided this environmental service in response to a negative incentive (a tax).
Stakeholders involved:
•	 Buyers: The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. The government ‘buys’ these ser-
vices by imposing a tax on those who do not supply the service.
•	 Sellers: Groundwater users. Farmers using groundwater for irrigation, industries and consumers utilizing 
groundwater ‘supply’ these services by decreasing groundwater use/abstractions. 
•	 Intermediaries: The tax was paid through municipal water bills, but was essentially a direct payment from 
groundwater users to government.
Payment scheme type: Public payment scheme using a fiscal mechanism. A groundwater tax was levied on 
groundwater users, collected through utilities bills. 
3.3 Identifying options for payment scheme design
Examples exist from around the world of how market-based mechanisms result in changes in 
choices and behaviour that benefit the environment. The essential point is to enable and motivate 
those who benefit from watershed services and to reward those who supply them. Maintaining and 
restoring these services becomes an internal part of planning and decision-making around land and 
water resources. If well designed and integrated into land-use plans, payment schemes can serve 
the interests of both those who benefit from ecosystem services and those who manage and sup-
ply them. Payment schemes for watershed services are thus an important tool for water resources 
and river basin management. To be effective, however, they must be designed appropriately and 
be suited to the goals and specific social, political and economic context in which they will operate. 
Effective design is critical. What practical steps are needed to identify suitable options for the design 
of payment schemes for watershed services? Three steps can easily be identified:
•	 Check	that	the	general	pre-conditions	for	payment	schemes	are	met.
•	 Clearly	define	the	goals	of	the	scheme.
•	 Determine	which	type	of	payment	scheme	is	most	suited	to	the	goals	of	the	scheme	and	stake-
holders involved.
“ENABLE AND MOTIVATE THOSE WHO BENEFIT FROM WATER-
SHED SERVICES AND REWARD THOSE WHO SUPPLY THEM.”
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3.3.1 Pre-conditions for payment schemes
There are a number of pre-conditions that are applicable to all payment schemes. These must 
be in place before developing a payment scheme. If they are not, then either payment schemes are 
not a suitable option, or time and resources must first be invested in meeting these benchmarks. 
Pre-conditions for payment schemes for watershed services include:
•	 Need and urgency: Watershed services are in decline, or there is a threat to future provision of 
these services. This condition establishes the need and urgency for action. Then, for any pay-
ment scheme to be effective and credible there must be a direct, scientifically justified relation 
between watershed services and changes in land cover, use and management.
•	 Support and governance: Strong institutional and political support exists for using a pay-
ment scheme instead of direct statutory or regulatory mechanisms for solving the problem. 
Relations between local communities and government should be constructive and there must 
be effective law enforcement. Strong and capable administrative structures should be 
available to administer the scheme.
•	 Suppliers: Stakeholders are present in the critical positions in the landscape supplying the 
watershed services that will be targeted by the scheme. They must hold property and/or legal 
rights to this land. They must be able to exert the controls on land use and management  nec-
essary to modify watershed services. Those supplying watershed services must be willing to 
participate in a payment scheme. 
•	 Beneficiaries: Public or private stakeholders who benefit from watershed services are present 
in the watershed. These stakeholders must recognise the benefits of watershed services and 
have expressed a demand for them. They must be able to justify participation in a payment 
scheme based on the value of the economic benefits they receive from watershed services. 
3.3.2 Defining goals for the scheme
The goal of a payment scheme for watershed services is to maintain or restore watershed ser-
vices. Which watershed services and how they will be measured and monitored must be clearly 
defined (see Chapter 2 and Table 2.1), according to the issue at hand and the needs of stakeholders. 
To succeed, the scheme must make a difference to these watershed services. This implies that the 
scheme must provide additionality. This is the action and effects that would not have occurred with-
out the scheme. Therefore goals for payments schemes need to be specified relative to a baseline. 
This baseline must be chosen carefully and should account for changes over time that are expected 
without the payment scheme in place. For example, payment schemes for reforestation in upper 
watersheds of Costa Rica build on static baselines for forested areas. If in reality forest cover would 
increase without the payment scheme, then the scheme ends up paying for action that would have 
happened anyhow, which may lead to a loss of credibility.24
“TO SUCCEED, A SCHEME MUST MAKE A DIFFERENCE TO 
WATERSHED SERVICES.”
Goals for payment schemes should clearly specify the geographical scale of the actions they are 
designed to facilitate. Schemes intended to promote very specific action in a small sub-catchment will 
need to be designed very differently to nationwide schemes that aim to support broad-scale provision 
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of watershed services for the public good. Nationwide schemes thus tend to have a public character 
while more site-specific schemes can more readily combine public and private participation or be 
designed as private payment schemes. 
To be effective, payment schemes also need to be consistent with social goals in the communities 
where they are to be implemented. Poor, rural people are often most dependent on watershed ser-
vices and therefore social equity is a vital component of the goals for payment schemes. If payment 
schemes increase inequity, they are unlikely to survive or to succeed. Experience from Costa Rica has 
shown that unless explicit steps are taken to address poverty issues, payment schemes can increase 
the disadvantages faced by the rural poor. Large farmers and forest owners can be disproportion-
ately represented among participants because those with large landholdings are more likely to have 
the flexibility needed to engage in innovative new programmes.25 There is then a danger that, as a 
result of the extra income generated through participation in a payment scheme, larger-scale land-
holders can out-compete smaller farmers, causing deeper poverty. In Costa Rica, exclusion of the 
poor from payment schemes has led to the emergence of unofficial, parallel schemes and growing 
pressure for official schemes to become more inclusive and to incorporate social equity in their goals. 
When developing a payment scheme for watershed services, there should be explicit goals relating 
to social equity that lead to assessment of the social impacts of the scheme and its implications for 
poverty reduction. 
To further increase their effectiveness, payment schemes should aim to prevent ‘leakage’. This 
results when action in one location simply causes degradation to shift to another area. For example, 
attention is needed to ensure that payments made to reduce forest clearing in one area of a water-
shed do not inadvertently cause clearing to increase in another area. 
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Photo 3.2 City water supplies delivered by truck depend on watershed services (Amman, Jordan).
“PAYMENT SCHEMES NEED TO BE CONSISTENT WITH 
SOCIAL GOALS IN THE COMMUNITIES WHERE THEY ARE TO BE 
IMPLEMENTED.”
Finally, payment schemes should aim to establish permanence. This is an issue when contracts for 
watershed services end and incentives for upstream landholders to undertake watershed manage-
ment cease. This implies that payment schemes should aim for long-term contracts. They should also 
be adaptively managed to ensure that funding mechanisms are responsive to the changing needs 
and circumstances of stakeholders.
“SCHEMES SHOULD AIM TO ESTABLISH PERMANENCE.”
3.3.3. Identifying suitable models for payment schemes
Payment schemes are most likely to succeed if the type of scheme chosen is suited to the stake-
holders involved, their motivations and capacities. It is important to verify that the following specific 
conditions can be met when selecting which type of scheme to use: 
•	 Private payment schemes: Beneficiaries must have a private motivation to pay for watershed 
services. Government agencies need to be willing and able to accept a minor role in the 
scheme, through development of regulations or changes in contract law needed to facilitate 
and enforce agreements.
•	 Cap-and-trade schemes: Governments must be willing to set the cap for the service in ques-
tion. This is to stimulate demand and reward the most efficient service sellers. Regulations 
must permit parties to either comply directly with the actions or control measures required or 
to pay service sellers to do so instead. 
•	 Certification schemes: Consumers need to express a demand for products that meet higher 
environmental standards, and be willing to pay a premium price for them. There must be 
intermediaries able to operate a credible certification service. Governments need to facilitate 
operation of certification schemes through appropriate laws and regulations.
•	 Public payment schemes: Public motivation to pay for watershed services exists and a public 
body must determine which services have the highest priority for protection. There must be 
sufficient financial resources available to support the payment scheme. 
3.4 Mobilizing financial resources
In designing a payment scheme for watershed services, there is an obvious emphasis on deter-
mining what services are bought, who is buying, who is selling and how transactions are conducted. 
How buyers pay and what sources of funding are available for developing and maintaining the 
scheme also need to be determined.
In cases where buyers are business entities with revenues directly linked to benefits from water-
shed services – a hydroelectric company for example – then private financing of the scheme might 
be justified on commercial grounds. For publicly-funded schemes and for schemes where the ben-
eficiaries simply do not have the financial resources needed, finance will have to be raised. Financial 
resources are also needed to pay the many other costs of a scheme, besides actual payments between 
buyers and sellers. These added costs need to be explicitly factored into the financing of schemes 
and include:
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•	 Research	and	development	costs	(e.g.	to	quantify	the	links	between	land	use,	management	
actions and water quantity available downstream).
•	 Capacity	building,	community	education	and	public	awareness	(e.g.	for	public-awareness	cam-
paigns to explain to consumers where their tap water comes from to promote their  willing-
ness to pay).
•	 Operational	costs	for	coordination	and	administration	(e.g.	for	consultants	or	NGOs	that	assist	
with the design or administration of a scheme).
•	 Monitoring	and	evaluation	(e.g.	for	assessment	of	impacts	and	additionality	of	a	scheme).
•	 Transaction	costs,	to	meet	social,	legal	and	regulatory	obligations	(e.g.	for	legal	counsel	and	
for lawyers to draft contracts).
•	 Contingencies	for	inflation	and	unforeseen	events.
Mechanisms for long-term financing of the scheme also need to be identified. Such sustainable 
financing is essential to creating a stable payment scheme under which both buyers and sellers have 
the confidence needed to commit to long-term contracts.
“ADDED COSTS NEED TO BE EXPLICITLY FACTORED INTO THE 
FINANCING OF SCHEMES.”
3.4.1 Sources of funding
A variety of financing mechanism can be used to fund payment schemes for watershed  services. 
Most schemes to date have relied on traditional sources of funding. These include taxpayer funding 
from government. For example, public funds in Mexico were reallocated from the irrigation to the 
forest sector to support watershed management. New public funds can be raised through taxes, as in 
Colombia where hydroelectric companies with capacity greater than 10 MW pay 6% of gross sales for 
watershed management. Many schemes, especially in developing countries, are initiated with seed 
money from bilateral or multilateral donor agencies, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF). 
Such grants are often augmented by loans from multilateral or regional banks, including the World 
Bank. These grants are used to overcome inertia and resistance as they lower the costs of to scheme 
participants. Grants also enable establishment of adequate monitoring and evaluation, to support 
learning and adaptive management. 
“MOST SCHEMES TO DATE HAVE RELIED ON PUBLIC OR 
DONOR FUNDS.”
In addition, there are a variety of new mechanisms for financing that can be applied to payment 
schemes for watershed services. These are summarised in Table 3.2. Trust funds for water are espe-
cially attractive, as they can be structured to provide stable funding over periods of decades. The 
Quito Water Fund in Ecuador is an example that has been financed by water users and is intended 
to operate for 80 years. Investment returns in the fund are used entirely for watershed protection, 
including payments to landholders for protection of ecosystem services in the upper watershed 
(Case 9).
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Case 9 Protecting watersheds – a water protection fund in Quito, Ecuador
The Water Protection Fund (FONAG) was created in 2000 in response to the pressing need for better 
management in the watershed that provides Quito’s water supply. The fund was created by a local NGO, 
Fundacion Antisana, and The Nature Conservancy (TNC), after the Ministry of Environment commissioned 
the development of a management plan for two reserves in the upper watershed. It was designed to run 
for 80 years, to ensure long-term institutional and political legitimacy. In 2006, the fund’s endowment was 
US$ 3.5 million, but was expected to grow to US$ 7.4 million by 2010. Essential to its success was the fact 
that the fund had strong support from the Mayor of Quito and other influential parties who championed 
the	plan,	and	from	the	two	major	water	users	in	the	watershed,	the	water	and	electrical	utilities.	
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Mechanism
User fees
Private sector payments
Government bonds
Water bank
Debt for nature swaps
Trust funds
Description
Fees for watershed management charged to 
consumers.
Payments by business for watershed 
services needed to sustain their income, 
or as grants to build reputation.
Public borrowing to finance payment 
schemes, by institutions with the legal right 
to do so and which believes it can raise the 
funds to repay the money.
Bank set up cooperatively by water 
boards to finance investments in water infra-
structure.
Public debt is purchased at a discount by an 
outside agency – such as an NGO – 
in exchange for commitments to fund 
conservation activities.
Endowment funds held to finance invest-
ment in water infrastructure and watershed 
management.
Examples
Municipal water rates increased for 
example in New York (USA); Bern (Switzerland); 
Heredia (Costa Rica); 
and Pimampiro (Ecuador) to finance 
payments for watershed services.
Payments for watershed services by 
hydropower companies in Costa Rica 
and by Nestlé Waters in France.
Bonds issued by New York City to finance 
watershed management programme 
developed as a cheaper alternative to 
construction of a filtration plant.
Dutch Water Bank (Nederlandse 
Waterschapsbank NV).
Potential future applications in financing pay-
ment schemes for watershed services.
The Water Protection Fund, Quito, 
Ecuador, which uses investment returns 
to fund management of watersheds 
supplying city water.
Table 3.2 Innovative financing mechanisms for payment schemes for watershed services 
that could be used to replace or augment traditional sources of public or international 
donor funding.
Ecosystem services provided: Watershed conservation to enhance drinking water quality in the city of Quito.
Stakeholders Involved:
•	 Buyers: FONAG and its contributors. EMAAP-Q, the water utility in Quito which contributed over US$ 
3 million, with smaller contributions by TNC, an electrical utility, a brewery and the Swiss development 
agency. 
•	 Sellers: Watershed managers and advocates. Those who undertake reforestation, surveillance of protected 
areas, sustainable management in agriculture, and development of ecotourism, training, communication 
and environmental education.
•	 Intermediaries: FONAG, Fundacion Antisana, and TNC. Several intermediaries worked to establish FONAG 
which now acts as intermediary and buyer. 
The fund is run as a non-declining endowment – only investment returns are distributed for watershed man-
agement. In the future, there is need to attract more investors, to expand the fund and broaden the decision-
making base and ensure that the interests of stakeholders, such as poor people, are not overlooked. 
3.4.2 Elements of sustainable financing
A sustainable financing strategy should be developed to strengthen the stability of payment 
schemes for watershed services and therefore the confidence of stakeholders in them. A range of 
issues should be considered. First of all, a diverse, stable and secure funding portfolio should be built 
to minimize risk. Second, budgeting should cover the full range of costs, not just payments. These 
additional costs can be considerable, especially for new schemes in an area. Third, funding of capac-
ity building for participants in the financial management and operation of the scheme. This is critical 
for the long-term sustainability of the mechanism. Finally, ensuring that a stable and enabling legal 
and institutional framework is developed to support the scheme. This may require making changes 
to law to ensure that participating institutions are entitled to raise funds and disburse them.
“LONGER TERM SUSTAINABLE FINANCING  SHOULD BE 
INCORPORATED INTO THE BUSINESS PLAN FOR A PAYMENT 
SCHEME.”
Sustainable financing should be incorporated into development of a business plan for the pay-
ment scheme. A business plan differs from simple budgeting for the scheme. It specifies how much 
money is needed to implement a set of planned activities and the sources of income to meet short, 
mid and long-term funding needs. Business planning can thus form the basis for setting priori-
ties, both for collecting revenues and for spending.
3.5 Checklist: designing payment schemes 
Creating markets to help internalize costs perceived as externalities
•	 Determine	if	the	elements	of	a	marketplace	for	watershed	services	are	in	place	or	need	to	be	
created. Is there recognition of the goods and services provided by watersheds, and are there 
potential buyers and sellers? Are intermediaries needed and are they available? Are there 
mechanisms in place for the negotiation and execution of transactions? Is there an enabling 
legal and institutional framework, including clearly defined property rights for watershed 
services?
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Understand willingness to pay and opportunity costs
•	 Use valuation data and economic analysis to compare the willingness to pay of service buyers 
and the opportunity costs of sellers. 
•	 Take into account the costs of alternatives to payments schemes, such as investment in infra-
structure. 
•	 Verify	that	there	is	an	overlap	between	the	requirements	of	upstream	and	downstream	stake-
holders that provides room for negotiation.
Clearly define the goals for the scheme
•	 Specify	 how	 the	 scheme	will	 provide	 additionality	 relative	 to	 a	 baseline,	 and	 consider	 the	
geographical scale of actions needed. 
•	 Ensure	that	the	scheme	will	address	social	equity	and	not	increase	the	disadvantages	faced	by	
poor people. 
•	 Be	aware	of	the	danger	of	leakage,	where	the	scheme	simply	shifts	the	location	of	resource	
degradation. Aim to establish permanence.
Carefully evaluate which type of payment scheme is the best fit
•	 Check	that	the	pre-conditions	for	any	payment	scheme,	relating	to	the	need	for	action,	gov-
ernance, supply and demand for services, can be met.
•	 Assess	whether	private	payment	schemes,	cap-and-trade,	certification	or	public	schemes	are	
suitable approaches given the social, economic and political context of the issue in question. 
Compare their advantages and disadvantages. 
•	 Determine	whether	the	specific	conditions	needed	for	each	type	of	scheme	can	be	met.
Identify financing needs and options for mobilizing funds
•	 Undertake	business	planning	and	include	a	strategy	for	sustainable	financing	of	the	scheme.
•	 Include	the	full	range	of	costs,	including	design,	administration,	legal	advice,	and	monitor-
ing and evaluation costs.
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C h a p t e r  4
Roadmap towards Agreement
Changing choices and behaviour using payments for watershed services is based on designing 
new incentives that are shaped by the logic of costs and benefits and by the psychology of the mar-
ket. To move from design of payment schemes to implementation and impacts demands that people 
and institutions become engaged. To get engagement, a path must be navigated through a complex 
landscape of multiple stakeholders and institutions. Along this path people and institutions need to 
become informed about the values of watershed services and understand how incentives schemes can 
be used to maintain or restore these services. Engagement should lead to interest in exploring options 
for the design and implementation of a payment scheme. Development of a scheme often requires 
a negotiation amongst stakeholders that can take many years. To complete these negotiations suc-
cessfully, facilitators and stakeholders need to have a shared understanding of the diverse interests, 
assets, capacities and power of the players. The aim should be the formation of an agreement on the 
design and implementation of a payment scheme that is effective, efficient, enforceable, transparent, 
equitable and sustainable.
“A PATH MUST BE NAVIGATED THROUGH A COMPLEX LANDSCAPE 
OF MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS AND INSTITUTIONS.”
4.1 Initiating engagement and dialogue 
The path towards agreement of a payment scheme begins with communication. All stakeholders 
need to learn and understand what a watershed is, the benefits it creates through watershed services 
and the value of these to the economy and households. Initiating discussions on watershed services 
and payment for their upkeep often requires people to change the way they think. To assist stake-
holders in this process, reliable information and know-how needs to be made available. Therefore, 
it is critical that the results of, for example, assessments of watershed services and their values are 
communicated in formats that stakeholders can comprehend. Communications need to cater for 
the differing information needs and technical capacities of the array of stakeholders involved. This 
implies that a range of communications products need to be developed to reach villagers, politicians, 
economic planners, industries, utilities, agri-businesses and international donors alike.
“MOVING TOWARDS AGREEMENT BEGINS WITH 
COMMUNICATION.”
As awareness of watershed services and their values builds, proponents of payment schemes need 
to share their vision for a new type of incentive that can support livelihoods, economic development 
and sustainable use of resources. They need to make clear how such incentives can change choices 
about how watersheds are used and managed. They also have to explain how the values of watershed 
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services justify financial transactions between beneficiaries and providers of services. Not least, they 
need to explain how these payments are in the interests of all parties. As engagement and interest 
grows, people need to come to the negotiation table to work out deals that transform the vision for 
a payment scheme into practice.
Multiple triggers for starting or accelerating dialogue about watershed services and payment 
schemes are possible, including:
•	 Changing policies: Government or private sector policies may change, perhaps as the limited 
impacts of statutory, command-and-control approaches to reducing land degradation become 
more apparent. New policies may encourage alternatives that devolve decision-making away 
from the centre towards farmers and other landowners. Bringing stakeholders together is 
then an opportunity to discuss how benefits can be generated and how these and their costs 
can be shared among stakeholders in a watershed. 
•	 New information: New information and broader understanding of the linkages between 
economic activities in watersheds may result in individuals or groups recognising their shared 
interests. For example, downstream irrigators facing sedimentation of canals might open dis-
cussions with upstream farmers about reducing soil erosion and sediment delivery to streams. 
Likewise, upstream farmers who wish to improve land management, but lack the necessary 
finance, could start a dialogue with downstream users over benefit sharing.
•	 Tension or conflict: Rising tension or conflict among stakeholders can be a powerful motiva-
tion for starting dialogue or coming to the negotiation table. For example, tension can easily 
arise in a watershed if downstream water users are impacted by a decline in water quantity 
or quality caused by abstraction or pollution of water upstream. Mechanisms for dialogue and 
dispute resolution then create opportunities to identify shared interests and enable stake-
holders to find innovative solutions. Where development pressures are high, forward thinking 
stakeholders may recognise that dialogue is needed. Participatory planning may then offer a 
forum for agreeing incentives for watershed management.
•	 Crisis: Crisis can provide an opportunity for change. The welfare impacts and economic losses 
caused by floods, drought or catastrophic hurricanes or cyclones can be both devastating and 
a powerful stimulus for action. At such times, stakeholders may have higher motivation for 
working together to reduce vulnerability. Windows of opportunity may be brief, but solidarity 
after a catastrophe can be used to bring people together to discuss new incentives for using 
watershed management to protect their shared interests.
Experience from ongoing payment schemes has shown that political support is vital if payment 
schemes are to move successfully from concept to negotiation.  For example, at the Sama Biological 
Reserve in Tarija in Bolivia, the local NGO Prometa has conducted several studies showing willingness 
to pay for environmental services by local users. However, the scheme has not taken off because in 
the prevailing political environment, it is seen as “a new water tax”.26
Another turning point on the pathway to agreement can be the emergence of a champion for a 
payment scheme. This might be an influential individual, group or coalition who is committed to the 
concept and its aims. Such a champion is likely to be outwardly free of vested interests in the way a 
watershed is managed and is therefore able to play the role of facilitator and catalyst for change. 
Champions for payment schemes have been institutions, NGOs or individuals able to articulate the 
potential effectiveness of a payment scheme. They are often connected to networks able to facilitate 
access to information sharing, technical assistance and funding. 
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4.2 Who should take part?
Clearly, for an agreement on a payment scheme to be reached, the right parties need to be 
involved in navigating the path towards agreement. Identifying these individuals and institutions 
is therefore a critical step in developing an agreement. Basically, there are four main categories of 
stakeholders that need to be represented during negotiations:
•	 Beneficiaries: those who have a demand for the maintenance or restoration of watershed 
services and who are potential buyers.
•	 Providers: those providing watershed services or could improve watershed services and who 
may act as sellers.
•	 Intermediaries: those who can broker links between buyers and sellers.
•	 Specialists: those who are able to provide information and assessments.
“ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF ALL THE STAKEHOLDERS IS VITAL.”
Clear channels of communication, consultation among parties and active participation of all the 
stakeholders are vital. These take time to establish. The time and resources used should be seen as 
investments, as they can reduce opposition and help to save time in the future. Though unilateral 
decisions are often quicker to implement, they rarely prove to be sustainable. It may be expedient, 
however, to keep the initial number of parties relatively limited while exploring and testing a pay-
ment scheme initiative, to allow some agreement to be reached with a smaller number of parties.
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Photo 4.1 Protest by activists and affected communities on World Water Day to demand clean drinking water 
(New Delhi, India).
4.2.1 Identifying buyers and sellers
Service beneficiaries
The key question in identifying potential buyers for watershed services is: who has economic 
interests in the watershed services at stake? Answers should begin to emerge from the identification 
of benefits from watershed services in valuation studies (Chapter 2.2). Knowing who to approach to 
participate in negotiation of a payment scheme then depends on whether demand for watershed 
services is from direct or indirect users of services. There are two broad categories of users, with dif-
ferent types of stakeholders associated with each.
“IDENTIFYING BUYERS REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE OF WHO HAS 
INTERESTS IN THE SERVICES AT STAKE.”
Direct users of watershed services are individuals or organised groups who are directly affected 
by land management upstream. This group could include hydropower generators or final consumers 
of domestic water supply (with demand channelled through waters utilities). It could also include 
water-related industries, such as beverage manufacturers, irrigators or pulp and paper companies. 
Direct users of services are more likely to include private buyers with interests in private payment 
schemes (Chapter 3.2.1)
There are a variety of possible indirect users of watershed services. These include national and 
local government, as well as international agencies with interests in financing of development or 
nature conservation. Pooling of buyers creates an indirect user of watershed services. In this case, 
services are bought by a single fund for users with a variety of interests, as in the example of FONAG, 
the Water Protection Fund in Quito, Ecuador (Case 9, Chapter 3). Pooling of service buyers is also an 
attractive option for governments where watershed services cannot be realistically financed directly 
by downstream users. Public payment schemes (Chapter 3.2.4) funded in whole or in part by national 
governments can improve provision of public goods. Examples of this practice include the Costa Rican 
programme of payments for ecosystems services’, the South-African programme ‘Working for Water’ 
and the ‘Sloping Land Conversion’ programme in China. 
The involvement of indirect users of watershed services increases when:
•	 The	ability-to-pay	of	downstream	stakeholders	is	low,	but	welfare	is	threatened	by	degrada-
tion of watershed services.
•	 Downstream demand is low, but upstream areas are of particular national interest or impor-
tance.
•	 The	 link	between	supply	and	demand	 is	not	 location-specific	or	cannot	be	quantified	suffi-
ciently, as might be the case for groundwater recharge.
•	 Downstream	users	 are	already	heavily	 taxed	and	 the	government	may	agree	 to	 re-allocate	
some of these funds to watershed service payments.
•	 Watershed	services	are	regarded	as	public	goods,	falling	under	governmental	responsibility.
Downstream ecosystems are water users and are therefore an important source of demand for 
watershed services. Developing mechanisms to enable water to be allocated to maintain down-
stream ecosystems can be critical for economies and societies. Mechanisms are needed for incorpo-
rating demand for water by downstream ecosystems in payment schemes. Some experience of this 
exists. For example, some revenues that are effectively derived from the environment, for example 
through tourism, can be earmarked to pay for watershed services (Box 4.1). In such cases, down-
stream demand for water by ecosystems needs to be represented in negotiations.
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“DOWNSTREAM ECOSYSTEMS ARE WATER USERS AND ARE 
THEREFORE AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF DEMAND FOR 
WATERSHED SERVICES.”
Box 4.1 Can downstream ecosystems pay? 
Downstream ecosystems are an important stakeholder in negotiating the allocation of watershed services. 
Around the world, legal and water policy instruments are being revised to recognise and protect environmental 
flows in river basins, as explained in the IUCN-WANI toolkit FLOW.27 However, especially in developing coun-
tries, implementing environmental flows can be constrained by lack of data, funds and technical capacity. 
Payments offer one approach for bridging the gap between concept and effective local practice – if local 
demand for ecosystem services that require allocation of water can be established. For example, it is  estimated 
that the Kruger National Park in South Africa would lose 30% of its tourism business if rivers flowing into the 
park dried up.28 Revenues from tourism can thus be applied to ensuring that this does not happen. The IUCN-
WANI toolkit VALUE29 provides further examples suggesting that the benefits from downstream ecosystems 
can form a basis for payments to maintain environmental flows. 
Most existing examples of payment schemes have brought together both direct and indirect 
beneficiaries in negotiations. In many cases, governmental or international agencies have made 
critical contributions early in the development of payment schemes. Their involvement is used to 
mobilize funds for pilot schemes and to promote trust among stakeholders. It is also used to encour-
age downstream users to pay and to set-up mechanisms for monitoring compliance by upstream 
landholders. Such external support often carries the expectation that negotiations will result in com-
mitments by direct stakeholders in services. 
Service providers
The objectives of any payment scheme have to clearly define what is being paid for. This 
needs to take into account the additionality criterion for payments as described in Chapter 3.3.2. 
Improvements in or maintenance of provision or management of a watershed service are specified 
relative to a baseline. Payment is then made if agreed actions have been carried out or if target val-
ues for indicators of watershed services have been met. Stakeholders invited to take part as service 
providers in negotiation of a payment scheme must be able to implement the needed controls on 
land use and management. They must be situated in the necessary positions in the landscape (see 
Chapter 2.1) and there should be a clear understanding of who holds property rights for both land 
and services (see Chapter 5.2.1). 
“OBJECTIVES OF ANY PAYMENT SCHEME HAVE TO CLEARLY 
DEFINE WHAT IS BEING PAID FOR.”
In reality, it may be necessary to make some service providers a higher priority than others. 
Blanket approaches that aim for broad-based participation can be suitable at national scale and are 
a way of cutting transaction costs. However, they also have inefficiencies because payments are then 
made outside of priority areas such as water recharge zones, biodiversity hot spots or communities 
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where vulnerable social groups are located. A critical question to consider, therefore, is which groups 
of service providers will have the biggest desired impact within the resources available. In the example 
in Box 4.2, priority groups were identified by determining which groups were most likely to be influ-
enced by payments.
Box 4.2 Determining priority groups of service providers
Opportunity costs for alternative land uses can help to determine which groups should be given priority as 
potential service sellers in negotiation of payment schemes for watershed services. The graph shown here was 
adapted from observations made in Brazil and Costa Rica30 to illustrate how the influence of incentives on 
decision-making varies among land uses. Here, conservation forestry is considered the desired land manage-
ment regime in order to maximize downstream environmental services. Land use returns from conservation 
forestry are low, in general, compared to land uses such as agriculture or livestock raising. Existing conservation 
forestry is not under threat of clearing because of enforced legal sanctions or because stakeholders do not have 
access to needed labour, credit or technology. In this context, paying for services from existing conservation 
areas makes no economic sense unless there are other reasons for targeting them, such as meeting social 
equity	objectives	or	because	of	the	influence	of	groups	with	vested	interests.31
Returns from livestock raising are significantly higher than the maximum willingness-to-pay of downstream 
service	buyers.	There	is	little	economic	justification	for	paying	livestock	farmers	to	change	land	use	without	a	
large subsidy that is likely to bear little relation to the value of or demand for the services provided. This leaves 
the agricultural sector as the group most likely to participate effectively in a payment scheme. The opportunity 
costs they face are comparable with the level of payments likely to be on offer. In this example, therefore, 
priority is given to the agricultural sector, because negotiation of a fair price that will influence choice and 
behaviour is feasible (see also Chapter 3.1.3). In reality, diversity within groups is likely to be high and explicit 
strategies are needed to ensure that the interests of the most vulnerable or disadvantaged are identified and 
protected during negotiations.
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Smallholders can be at a disadvantage in negotiating deals for payment schemes, because 
transaction and monitoring costs are lower for larger properties. This problem can be reduced by 
grouping landholders together as associations or cooperatives. A representative may negotiate 
on behalf of the group, and in turn arrange individual contracts with group members. For example, 
in Mexico, the authority representing the ejidos (communal lands) applies for payments from the 
government based on existing forest cover. These payments are subsequently redistributed within 
the ejido by the authority based on internal agreements relating to the distribution of land. 
However, experience has shown that special care is needed when sub-contracting within groups 
in this way, because it is difficult to guarantee compliance from everyone. There can thus be a 
danger that an agreement may be void if only one provider breaks the commitment.
4.2.2 Identifying brokers and supporting negotiations
Intermediaries
Direct upstream-downstream negotiations are the simplest way to reach deals on payments for 
ecosystem services. For example, in Costa Rica the hydroelectric company La Esperanza has made 
direct payments for water regulation to a private cloud forest reserve located in their recharge area 
since 1998. This is a relatively straightforward arrangement, with a one-to-one deal between power-
ful and knowledgeable players. Existing land use is agreed and not in danger of changing in the 
future. In addition, the scheme provided a mechanism for settling disputes over land tenure and 
securing access to the stream by the hydroelectric company.
Such clear-cut examples of direct negotiation between service buyers and sellers are rare. In 
most cases there are many upstream land users and many downstream interest groups. In these cases 
brokering is necessary and intermediaries emerge. 
“DIRECT UPSTREAM-DOWNSTREAM NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE 
SIMPLEST WAY TO REACH DEALS.”
Intermediaries are often essential catalysts in setting up and running payment schemes. They 
act as an honest broker between service buyers and sellers to improve the process of negotiation. 
They help to define contractual terms, fill institutional gaps and facilitate financial transactions. 
These roles can be vital and result in lower transaction costs and increased trust and transpar-
ency. Intermediaries are commonly local NGOs, community groups or government agencies who are 
funded or subsidised by donor organizations. Intermediaries often act in effect as administrators for 
a scheme.
An effective intermediary seeks to maximize downstream service buyers’ demand by identifying 
sellers who will deliver the greatest improvement in services at the lowest cost. This is not straight-
forward and is almost certain to vary by location. The principle should hold unless other political, 
social or environmental criteria are imposed or included in the goals of the scheme.
In their role as honest broker, intermediaries must also weigh up possible perverse incentives 
for changes in currently benign land uses created by payments. For example, a payment scheme 
supporting silvopastoral land management in Central America had the perverse incentive of encour-
aging some landholders to cut trees. Payments were only offered for increasing tree cover up to a 
threshold level. Farmers with land where existing tree cover was higher than the threshold, were 
then only eligible for payments if they first cleared some of the trees. This forced the programme 
to also pay for pre-existing environmental services, as this was cheaper than scrutinising pre-existing 
land cover.32
“INTERMEDIARIES MUST ALSO WEIGH UP POSSIBLE PERVERSE 
INCENTIVES FOR CHANGES.”
Perverse incentives are associated with the concept of ‘crowding out’. This occurs when people 
who are currently good environmental stewards stop providing voluntary and free services. By intro-
ducing payments, a scheme may unintentionally undermine positive, voluntary and unpaid behaviour 
– in effect, crowd it out. In the case of the silvopastoral programme, there were sufficient funds to 
buy the scheme out of unexpected behavioural responses to payments. The ability of smaller schemes 
to overcome the problem of perverse incentives and crowding-out may be much less. There are risks 
and costs associated with ‘learning by doing’. Intermediaries can therefore help to strengthen pay-
ment schemes by leading exploratory scenario analysis and feasibility studies (see Chapter 6). 
Specialist support
An effective intermediary should try to concentrate on facilitating negotiations and administra-
tion of the scheme, delegating technical functions to specialists. Assistance can be provided with 
feasibility studies, communication and exchange of information, forest management plans, and 
monitoring, including collection and management of hydrological data. Specialist support is also 
often used to support participation by landholders. For example, FONAFIFO in Costa Rica administers 
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Photo 4.2 Identifying water abstraction points helps to determine stakeholder groups and potential buyers and 
sellers of watershed services (Pangani Basin, Tanzania).
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the national PES (Payment for Environmental Services) programme, but delegates monitor and liaise 
at the local level with local groups such as FUNDECOR. These local groups are in direct contact with 
local farmers, helping to prepare applications for payments. They are also a vital conduit for feedback 
to intermediaries, supporting learning and adaptation of the scheme (see Chapter 6).
Specialist support usually includes financial institutions that manage transactions and make pay-
ments. Banks help to ensure transparency and are better suited to managing trust funds or to collect-
ing and making payments than an intermediary handing out cash in the back of an office. Specialist 
legal and institutional support is also often needed. 
“SPECIALIST SUPPORT IS OFTEN USED TO SUPPORT 
PARTICIPATION BY LANDHOLDERS.”
While some intermediaries might be able to provide some of these services, delegation to 
competent parties is a means of cutting transaction costs. For example, FONAFIFO has kept transac-
tions costs in Costa Rica’s national payment scheme for ecosystems services to the low level of 7%. 
Partnerships with local support groups have been instrumental, providing on-site technical control 
and speeding up processing by pre-screening applications. While FONAFINO keeps accounts for the 
scheme, a designated bank carries out actual financial transactions. 
4.3 Navigating institutions and power 
Having identified who should be engaged in negotiation of agreements on payments for water-
shed services, it is then necessary to understand the motivations and capacities of the different par-
ties, and how they interact through current institutions. The key point is that, in addition to being 
environmentally defensible (Chapter 2), payment schemes must be socially and politically acceptable 
and institutionally feasible. Facilitators thus need to guide negotiations effectively, with the aim of 
successfully establishing governance for payment schemes that will work as intended. Stakeholder 
and institutional analysis provide the information needed to help facilitators navigate the complex 
interests and relationships that shape the context in which the payment scheme will have to operate. 
“UNDERSTAND THE MOTIVATIONS AND CAPACITIES OF THE 
DIFFERENT PARTIES.”
4.3.1 Institutional analysis
It is important to gain an in-depth understanding of the way people are organized in the water-
shed. This is the institutional context and it frames the way people and communities interact and is 
the organizational setting in which a payment scheme will have to operate. The purpose of institu-
tional analysis is to identify how institutions link to and influence buyers and sellers of watershed 
services and what changes are needed for a payment scheme to succeed. Both local and external 
institutions need to be considered. At the local level, the assessment needs to ask:
•	 What	are	the	rules	that	currently	govern	watershed	management,	whether	formal	or	
 informal, and whether enforced or not?
•	 What	institutions	are	important	in	the	operation	of	these	rules?	
•	 What	other	institutions	shape	the	choices	and	behaviour	of	people	in	the	watershed?
•	 Who	controls	these	institutions	and	what	incentives	(or	disincentives)	do	they	create	
 for watershed management?
•	 What	institutions	if	any	currently	link	potential	buyers	and	sellers	of	watershed	services?
•	 What	support	can	local	institutions	provide	for	negotiation?
“PAYMENT SCHEMES MUST BE SOCIALLY AND POLITICALLY
ACCEPTABLE AND INSTITUTIONALLY FEASIBLE.”
External actors that need to be considered are outside institutions trying to promote (or reduce) 
change. This includes intermediaries and champions in payment schemes, but also other outside 
influences, such as other development or conservation projects in a watershed. The assessment needs 
to identify the goals of these groups and the resources and incentives they bring to the watershed. 
Their influence on local institutions needs to be characterized.
Guidance for negotiations should emerge from the institutional analysis. This should be used 
to shape the architecture of the payment scheme – that is how it should be constructed to function 
effectively within the local reality. For example, the assessment should help negotiators decide what 
institutions should be involved, what roles are appropriate and where gaps mean that new institu-
tions need to be created.
In Costa Rica, participation of a private hydropower company in a national payment scheme for 
watershed services is facilitated by a set of institutions that link landowners and consumers. Each 
institution has a specific role in the architecture of the payment scheme (Case 10).
Case 10 Institutional roles in a scheme for financing of upstream reforestation in 
Costa Rica 33 
The Government of Costa Rica originally established the National Forest Office and National Fund for Forest 
Financing (FONAFIFO) to provide incentives for reforestation. FONAFIFO compensates private landowners who 
agree to protect, sustainably manage or reforest their land. The Fund is financed by a 5% national sales tax 
on fossil fuels. FONAFIFO also serves as an intermediary between hydropower companies and upstream forest 
owners. 
Energía Global (now Enel Latin America), a private hydropower company located in the Sarapiqui watershed, 
provides electricity for about 400,000 consumers. The company wanted to protect the watershed to increase 
the reliability of streamflow throughout the year and to reduce sedimentation. Through FONAFIFO, Energía 
Global pay owners of upstream private land to reforest their land, engage in sustainable forestry or conserve 
forest cover. Landowners who have recently cleared their land or landowners planning to replace natural forest 
with plantations are not eligible for compensation. Energía Global pays US$ 18 per hectare to FONAFIFO, which 
then adds an additional US$ 30 per hectare. FONAFIFO makes cash payments to landowners who have signed 
contracts with Energía Global. Total payments of US$ 48/hectare/year are related to the opportunity costs 
reforestation or forest conservation, such as potential revenues from cattle ranching. A local NGO, FUNDECOR 
(Fundación para el Desarrollo de la Cordillera Volcánica Central), oversees the implementation of the conserva-
tion activities, carries out technical studies and administers the scheme. 
Downstream communities in Colombia found that existing institutions were not able to address 
their interests in protection of watershed services. To fill this gap they created water user associations 
to facilitate investment in watershed management (Case 11).
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Case 11 Formation of water user groups to organize investment in watershed 
protection in the Cauca River Basin, Colombia34 
The fertile Cauca river basin in Colombia has abundant water resources that supply 5 million people in the 
region. However, rapid urban, industrial, and agricultural development in the late 1980s resulted in increas-
ing water scarcity in summer and flooding during the rainy season. Impacts on farmers were severe because 
Colombian water laws require that water is allocated first to domestic users. The Cauca Valley Corporation 
(CVC), the regional environmental authority responsible for water allocation and environmental protection, did 
not have the financial resources needed to deal with the water shortages faced by farmers. 
Faced with growing water scarcity and inadequate public finances, farmers in the Cauca river basin formed 
12 water user associations to invest in protecting upstream watershed areas. The water user associations are 
funded by voluntary user fees paid by members based on water consumption. Proceeds are put into a fund 
that is used by CVC to finance watershed restoration activities intended to improve streamflow. Land manage-
ment contracts are agreed with upstream forest landowners and funds are also used to purchase land in critical 
locations in the watershed. 
4.3.2 Power analysis
Stakeholder analysis is used to discover which individuals, groups and institutions have an interest 
in a payment scheme. A fundamental step is to examine what differences there are among stake-
holder groups in their interests, capacities and influence. This can uncover answers to critical issues 
that negotiators of a payment scheme will have to deal with, such as: who might be the winners and 
losers, who are the barriers to change and who has interests that need to be protected? Facilitators 
need answers to these questions to steer negotiations towards agreement.
Power analysis35 is a useful tool in stakeholder analysis. It is based on:
•	 Identification	of	the	key	stakeholders.
•	 Assessment	of	their	interests,	characteristics	and	circumstances.
•	 Identification	of	interactions	between	stakeholders	and	their	context.
•	 Assessment	of	the	power	over	decision-making	held	by	stakeholders.
•	 Analysis	 of	 the	 control	 stakeholders	 have	 over	 the	 actions	 needed	 to	 operate	 a	 payment	
scheme.
As shown in Table 4.1, the results from power analysis are used to relate the power of different 
stakeholders to their potential to control implementation or be affected by a payment scheme. 
Thus, it may be most beneficial to invite powerful stakeholders with a high-level of control to be 
partners in development of the payment scheme. An example of such a stakeholder might be a 
water or hydroelectric utility, or beverage manufacturer. Smallholder farmers in upper watersheds 
likely hold little power, but have high levels of control, making their involvement vital. Similarly, 
smallholder farmers on a downstream floodplain have little power, but watershed management 
can have a large impact on their interests. Care is therefore needed to ensure that there is support 
for the participation in negotiations of groups that lack power and that their interests are protect-
ed. Powerful stakeholders with little control may be in a position to block or scupper agreements 
that are perceived to threaten their interests. Agreements need mechanisms to overcome or avoid 
any barriers to change they may create. Finally, stakeholders without power who are not involved 
in or affected by watershed management should not influence negotiations.
Table 4.1 Stakeholder power and their potential to either control implementation or to be 
impacted by a payment scheme, with the implications for negotiations of engagement of 
each category of stakeholder36
4.4 Paving the way for successful negotiations 
4.4.1 Setting up the process
Successfully negotiating a payment scheme for watershed services should end in a sustainable 
agreement that incorporates the needs of both buyers and sellers of services. This cannot mean that 
all parties come away with all of their wishes met. Compromise is an essential ingredient of reaching 
agreement. This demands an approach to negotiation that is integrative rather than distributive. In 
a distributive negotiation process, parties simply haggle over how to divide up the cake differently. 
For one party to gain, another party must lose. This style of negotiation will never provide the out-
come desired from a payment scheme for watershed services, which is to create incentives for better 
choices. 
“COMPROMISE IS AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT OF REACHING 
AGREEMENT.”
The alternative is to use an integrative approach, which builds on collective learning and incor-
porates the wider interests of stakeholders that stretch beyond the immediate issues of watershed 
services. Instead of having to adamantly defend their positions – or their slice of the cake – parties 
can use the negotiation as a forum to educate other participants about the concerns and constraints 
they face. As mutual understanding grows, stakeholders can then develop solutions to problems that 
accommodate shared interests and acceptable compromises. 
For example, using integrative negotiation processes might mean that solving secondary issues 
can be a catalyst for wider agreement. In Costa Rica, upstream land managers were not in favour of 
participating in a payment scheme if benefits were simply dollars paid per hectare. If road improve-
ments and access to land titles were included, then agreement was possible. In Sukhomajri, India 
compensation was negotiated for restrictions on grazing in upland areas. The agreement included 
construction of new irrigation infrastructure and mechanisms for benefit sharing, as the community 
had an interest in diversifying their livelihoods (see Case 15, Chapter 6). 
Negotiation will not always be successful. There may just be too much divergence in the interests 
of the various stakeholders. In such cases, any agreement might inevitably leave some people worse 
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off, making it impossible for them to participate. Cooperation might be difficult because information 
is hidden from some stakeholders. There may just not be enough evidence to convince all parties that 
it is worth taking part, leaving too much uncertainty about, for example, links between the actions 
of service providers and the value of benefits. 
Information is thus a crucial input to the negotiation process. The essential components of the 
evidence base that need to be brought to the negotiation are the assessment of watershed ser-
vices	(Chapter	2.1);	the	valuation	of	watershed	services	(Chapter	2.2);	the	design	framework	for	the	
scheme	(Chapter	3.3);	and	the	stakeholder	and	institutional	analysis	(Chapter	4.2	and	4.3).	
“INFORMATION IS A CRUCIAL INPUT INTO THE NEGOTIATION 
PROCESS.”
4.4.2 Elements of an agreement
Agreements on payment schemes for watershed services involve a formal contract between buy-
ers and sellers of services. The form of this contract, and the parties included, varies with the type of 
scheme (Chapter 3.2). However, all agreements have some fundamental elements:
•	 Services provided: The agreement should specify the services provided. These must be carefully 
defined, to ensure that all parties have the same understanding of what is being paid for. 
Contracted services can be specified in terms of management actions implemented – such as 
hectares of forest planted – or in terms of quantitative service indicators. Caution is needed, 
however, when using service indicators such as, nutrient loads in rivers or minimum flows. 
Besides requiring sophisticated systems for measurement, natural variability of indicator 
values may be high and there is a danger that sellers may not meet contractual obligations 
through no fault of their own. 
•	 Compensation: The amount and form of compensation for services provided must be agreed 
and clearly specified. Buyers and sellers need to reach agreement on the price for contracted 
services (Chapter 3.1.3) and whether payment will be cash, in-kind or a combination of both. 
Cash is the most flexible incentive, but other, in-kind benefits, such as road improvements or 
beehives, can also motivate participation.
•	 Monitoring and compliance: Parties need to specify how monitoring of implementation of 
the agreement will be done. They need to clearly define what will be measured and what 
sanctions will be put in place if parties fail to comply with their commitments (see Chapters 
5 and 6).
•	 Governance and management: Parties must agree on who will administer the scheme and 
how roles and responsibilities are allocated among institutions and other stakeholders (Box 
4.3).
“AGREEMENTS ON PAYMENT SCHEMES INVOLVE A FORMAL 
CONTRACT.”
Box 4.3 Allocating roles and responsibilities in the governance and management 
of payment schemes
The allocation of roles and responsibilities may vary enormously according to the stakeholders and institutions 
involved, their capacities and the goals, scale and type of scheme. However, here are some guidelines: 
•	 Operation	of	payment	schemes	can	be	supported	by	a	management	board,	which	meets	regularly	to	make	
the most important decisions for the scheme. The board should include representation of stakeholders, 
such as water-user groups, farmers or other service suppliers, government, the academic sector, and 
conservation or development NGOs in the area. 
•	 Administration	of	the	scheme	may	be	done	by	an	intermediary	group,	working	directly	with	the	general	
board to execute the decisions taken, but delegating specialist tasks to third parties. The intermediary is 
responsible for drawing up and managing contracts, and ensuring that compliance is monitored. 
•	 Baseline	 studies	 are	 usually	 contracted	 out	 to	 private	 consultants,	 technical	NGOs	 or	 universities.	 These	
studies cover hydrological assessments, water demand, land-use mapping, cadastral mapping, stakeholder 
analysis, historical narratives and policy reviews. 
•	 Technical	support	for	landholders,	to	help	them	to	implement	changes	in	management	practices	or	restore	
vegetation cover for example, is usually contracted out to specialists by larger schemes. Smaller schemes 
sometimes have an extension agent on staff. 
•	 Management	 of	 funds	 is	 best	 delegated	 to	 banks.	 This	 also	minimizes	 the	 transaction	 costs	 for	 pay-
ments.
In some circumstances, a ‘do-it-yourself’ approach is used. For example, in Heredia, Costa Rica the water 
utility ESPH deals directly with private landholders upstream (see Case 3, Chapter 3). However, utilities 
usually prefer to delegate to intermediaries with the knowledge and skills needed for working with 
farmers. 
4.5 Checklist: reaching agreement
Engage stakeholders through effective communication
•	 Communicate	the	results	from	assessments	of	watershed	services	and	valuation	studies.
•	 Develop	a	common	vision	for	how	new	types	of	incentives	can	change	choices	in	watershed	
management. Explain how values for watershed services justify financial transactions. 
Get the right parties involved
•	 Identify	who	needs	to	be	involved	in	negotiation	of	the	payment	scheme.
•	 Involve	potential	service	buyers	who	directly	or	indirectly	use	watershed	services,	not	forget-
ting provision for the environment itself. 
•	 Invite	 those	potential	 service	 sellers	 able	 to	 provide	 the	most	 impact	 given	 the	 amount	of	
financing likely to be available. 
•	 Aim	to	have	intermediaries	act	as	honest	brokers,	for	example	from	local	NGOs,	community	
groups or government agencies. 
•	 Identify	specialist	support	needed	to	assist	planning	and	decision-making	in	the	negotiation	
process. 
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Carry out targeted analysis to support negotiations
•	 Assess	 the	 relative	 influence	 and	 control	 over	 watershed	 management	 of	 different	 stake-
holder groups using power analysis.
•	 Use	institutional	analysis	to	help	decide	what	institutions	need	to	be	involved	in	a	payment	
scheme, what roles are appropriate and where new institutions are needed to fill gaps.
•	 Use	stakeholder	and	institutional	analysis	to	guide	negotiations	towards	agreements	that	will 
be institutionally feasible and socially and politically acceptable. Ensure that the interests of 
key stakeholders with little power are protected during negotiations.
Develop a negotiation process between buyers and sellers
•	 Use negotiation based on collective learning and mutual understanding of the wider inter-
ests of parties. Aim to develop agreements that accommodate shared interests and incorpo-
rate acceptable compromises among buyers and sellers.
•	 Ensure	 that	 negotiated	 agreements	 clearly	 specify:	 the	 services	 to	 be	 provided	 under	 the	
payment	scheme;	the	amount	and	form	of	compensation;	how	implementation	will	be	moni-
tored;	sanctions	for	non-compliance;	and	how	the	scheme	will	be	administered.
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C h a p t e r  5 
Rules at Work
Payment schemes for watershed services need clear and enforceable rules and transaction mech-
anisms. Without an understanding of these and agreement by all parties, a payment scheme will not 
operate successfully. Failure to establish appropriate rules and transaction mechanisms is likely to 
erode trust and confidence among stakeholders. The new choices and behaviours in watershed man-
agement promoted by the scheme will then not be implemented. The key ingredients are effective 
institutions and reliable contract law, supported by good governance, effective transaction capacities 
and credible enforcement. Hence, designing the rules for a payment scheme calls for development 
of an institutional framework for the scheme. This includes the clarification of rights, agreement of 
obligations among parties, establishment of contractual arrangements and mechanisms for ensuring 
compliance and enforcement.
“PAYMENT SCHEMES FOR WATERSHED SERVICES NEED CLEAR AND 
ENFORCEABLE RULES AND TRANSACTION MECHANISMS.”
5.1 Enabling institutions
5.1.1 Institutional framework
Any rules for payments schemes must operate within a wider framework of institutions that is 
shaped by both formal laws and policies and customary arrangements.37 The institutional framework 
for a payment scheme is the combination of organisations, social structures and mechanisms that 
support order and cooperation in relationships between parties. Institutions make and enforce the 
rules, which are the legislative, customary and/or contractual norms used in implementing a pay-
ment scheme. Rules specify the rights and obligations of parties and the responsibilities and powers 
of institutions.
“ANY RULES FOR PAYMENTS SCHEMES MUST OPERATE WITHIN 
A WIDER FRAMEWORK OF INSTITUTIONS.”
Formal institutions provide ‘the rules of the game’ and include for example, water law and water 
policy as well as formal administrative mechanisms in the water, land and wider natural resources 
sectors. Customary institutional arrangements are ‘the rules in use’, or how people actually deal with 
each other according to customary law and traditions. Payment schemes interact with both types of 
institutions and their associated rules and transaction mechanisms. The relative strength of one over 
the other, however, strongly influences which options are available in practice for developing and 
implementing a payment scheme for watershed services.
Formalization of the water sector depends heavily on the level and pace of economic develop-
ment in a country (Table 5.1). For example, in the developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the 
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water sector is much less formalized than in the highly industrialized countries of Western Europe. 
As a result, the water sector in sub-Saharan Africa is principally organized on the basis of customary 
arrangements applied at community level. In a highly-industrialized economy, in contrast, large water 
industries are organized on a commercial basis. A different institutional framework is needed for a 
payment scheme in each of these settings. 
“LOCAL PAYMENT SCHEMES MAY BE OPERATED USING INFORMAL 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.”
Where the formal institutional environment is ineffective – because laws are weak or not 
enforced – local payment schemes may be operated using informal institutional arrangements that 
are based on customary law.38 Key legal issues in making rules for a payment scheme in this context 
are clarification of rights and tenure and establishing effective compliance and enforcement mecha-
nisms (Table 5.1). Where the reach of formal laws is wide and effective, a payment scheme can make 
use of existing law – relating for example to enforcement of contracts – and therefore new rules are 
likely to focus most heavily on how to monitor compliance (Table 5.1).
The rules needed to run a payment scheme for watershed services effectively also vary with 
scale and the public or private nature of the scheme. At local scales where deals are made between 
buyers and sellers of specific services, for example relating to sustainable use of a specific forest 
area, schemes may be based on private agreements (Chapter 3.2.1). Reliable contract law, or clear 
customary norms, and enforcement capacity are then key. As scale increases, it is harder to directly 
link buyers and sellers of services and the need grows for appropriate public institutions to facilitate 
transactions (see Chapter 3.2.4).39 
“RELIABLE CONTRACT LAW, OR CLEAR CUSTOMARY NORMS, AND 
ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY ARE KEY.”
Table 5.1 Influence of level of formality on the development of the institutional and legal 
framework for a payment scheme for watershed service. 
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Stages of institutional 
development
Completely informal
Largely informal
Formalizing
Highly formalized
Examples
Sub-Saharan Africa
Bolivia, India, Nicaragua
Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, 
Tanzania, eastern China, 
eastern Europe, Mekong 
region
North America, Western 
Europe, Australia
Formal/customary 
institutions
Weak / Strong
Weak / Strong
Emerging / Falling
Strong / Weak
Institutional arrange-
ments in water sector
Self-supply and community 
management
Growing public provision 
but self-supply dominates
Private-public provision to 
improve service and man-
age resources
Modern water industry 
Self-supply disappears
Priority legal issues 
for payment schemes
Land and water rights, 
compliance an enforcement
Land and water rights, 
compliance an enforcement
Land and water rights, 
compliance an enforcement
Compliance
5.1.2 Good governance
Development of an institutional framework is not in itself sufficient to ensure that rules for a 
payment scheme can be implemented. Good governance is needed to bridge the gap that frequently 
exists between formal agreements on management of water resources and how rules are played 
out, and contracts established and enforced, at local level. The role of good governance is to pro-
mote compliance with the scheme by fostering cooperation and coordination among sectors, levels 
of government and public stakeholders. It is critical to bear in mind, however, that translating the 
rhetoric of good governance into meaningful action is as much a challenge for payment schemes as 
for the wider water sector:
“Although Water Governance and holistic and integrated approaches to water resources man-
agement feature strongly in the international water agenda, in many countries water governance is 
in a state of confusion. The specific water governance issues vary. In some countries, there is a total 
lack of water institutions, and others display fragmented institutional structures (sector-by-sector 
approach) and overlapping and/or conflicting upstream and downstream interests regarding ripar-
ian rights and access to water resources are pressing issues that need immediate attention; in many 
other cases there are strong tendencies to divert public resources for personal gain, or unpredict-
ability in the use of laws and regulations and licensing practices, which impede markets and licens-
ing practices and encourage corruption and other forms of rent-seeking behaviour”.40 
“SAFEGUARDING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL 
SET-UP IS VITAL.”
Thus, in many settings, the reality is that achieving the level of good governance required for 
a payment scheme will depend on wider reforms of governance and democratization in water and 
land resources management. Provision for citizen participation is important, including the right 
of citizens and non-governmental organizations to bring lawsuits for the purpose of enforcing the 
rules and contracts associated with payment schemes. Safeguarding the credibility of the institu-
tional set-up is vital. Efforts must be made to prevent bribery or falsification of data, for example 
through criminal liability. Application of the law has to be fair and consistent, for example based on 
written guidance and policies for interpreting and implementing the rules and requirements of a 
payment scheme. The overall aim of governance structures should be to create order and to mitigate 
conflict for the benefit of all parties. 
5.2 Legal and contractual framework
5.2.1 Clarifying rights
Successfully establishing and operating a payment scheme for watershed services demands clear 
understanding of property rights and tenure rights. Property rights are crucial for two reasons. 
First of all, the distribution of payments among land users will be a source of conflict if property 
rights are not clear to everyone. These rights relate to both tenure and the ownership of watershed 
services. With clearly defined rights to sell services, disputes over who is entitled to be paid will be 
prevented. Second, insecure tenure is often directly related to overexploitation of natural resources 
and thus degradation of environmental services. If tenure is unclear, payments for services may end 
up providing further impetus for overuse of resources. For example, without clearly assigned tenure 
rights, the prospect of payment for land and water management may attract increased numbers of 
resource users to an area.
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Property rights vary significantly from country to country. In general, a clear scheme of 
property rights needs to address the following questions:41
•	 Who	may	enter	a	property	and	enjoy	non-extractive	benefits?
•	 Who	has	the	right	to	use	the	resource	(the	‘usufruct’	right)	or	control	how	it	will	be	used?
•	 Who	can	exclude	others	from	unauthorized	use?
•	 Who	may	derive	income	from	the	resource?
•	 Who	has	the	right	to	sell	all	or	some	of	these	rights	to	others,	either	permanently,	or	for	a	
limited time (such as through a lease)?
•	 Who	has	the	right	to	pass	these	rights	down	to	one’s	successors	(the	right	of	descendants	to	
inherit land or resource rights)?
•	 How	are	land	and	resources	protected	from	illegal	expropriation?
All of these tenure issues need to be taken into account for property rights to effectively sup-
port a payment scheme for watershed services. Hence, property rights must provide for more than 
the regulation of land ownership and include the natural resources that land provides. Ensuring that 
property rights are clearly designated – whether though formal law or customary arrangements – 
is an essential step in ensuring that payment schemes result in the intended incentives for better 
choices and behaviours in watershed management.
The process of registering tenure rights can be an instrument for clarifying rights among stake-
holders. A right can only be registered once a person is entitled to this right. Registration of rights 
is thus a test of rights and a mechanism for determining who are the actual service providers under 
payment schemes for watershed services. 
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Photo 5.1 Warning signs indicate that the polluted Zarqa river (Amman, Jordan) no longer provides services to 
support drinking water supply or recreation. 
However, registering tenure rights must not ignore customary rights, as this would lead to social 
exclusion and, in many contexts, unsustainable land use. Tenure systems must accommodate both 
formal property rights recognised by the legal system, such as land titles, permits and licences, and 
customary rights. Customary rights are unwritten or informal rights, based on long-term occupation 
or tradition, through which rural people have access to natural resources. A payment scheme that 
excludes land users without registered property titles – very often indigenous communities – will 
further marginalize already poor communities. This could then well lead these stakeholders to revert 
to unsustainable or illegal land uses to generate revenues.
“THE DESIGN OF OBLIGATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS IS CRITICAL 
TO THE SUCCESS OF THE PAYMENT SCHEME.”
5.2.2 Setting obligations and requirements
The overall goals of the parties in a payment scheme for watershed services are straightforward. 
One party, the service buyer, wants to ensure that a particular watershed service or a bundle of 
services is delivered. The other party, the service provider, wants to be rewarded for the benefits 
delivered. To be more than a declaration of intent, however, these goals must be backed up by 
clearly defined obligations and requirements with real legal meaning. Obligations and requirements 
can be understood as the specific practices and procedures required by the payment scheme. The 
precise design of these obligations and requirements is critical to the success of the payment scheme. 
Parties might agree to define obligations under a scheme on the basis of actions, results or outcomes. 
These can be monitored against specific targets for an agreed set of indicators (see Chapters 2 and 
6). If payment schemes are well designed, then compliance will achieve the desired environmental 
results. If they are poorly designed, then compliance will be hard to achieve or fail to deliver the 
intended results. 
“A GOOD DESIGN WILL REFLECT THE PRACTICAL REALITIES OF 
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT.”
A good design for the legal framework of a payment scheme will reflect the practical realities 
of compliance and enforcement. In general terms, specification of obligations and requirements 
should include:42
•	 A	clear	and	understandable	definition	of	the	watershed	services	covered	by	the	scheme,	the	
stakeholders involved and activities subject to regulation.
•	 Clarification	of	the	legal	authority	underlying	the	scheme.
•	 Explicit	definition	of	the	timeframe	for	implementation	of	the	scheme.	
•	 Measurable	indicators	for	the	activities	to	be	performed	or	services	supplied	in	terms	of	results	
or outcomes.
•	 Precise	definitions	and	exceptions,	to	enable	identification	of	non-compliance.
•	 Narrow	definition	of	 any	 exceptions,	 to	 avoid	 situations	 in	which	 exceptions	 ‘swallow’	 the	
definitions.
•	 Consistent	use	of	definitions	throughout	the	text	of	the	scheme.
•	 Coordination	 among	 different	 schemes	 and	 policies,	 to	 prevent	 ambiguity	 and	 conflicts	
between their obligations and requirements.
•	 Enough	 flexibility	 to	ensure	 the	 scheme	can	be	 constructively	adapted	 to	 changing	circum-
stances.
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Participation and negotiation
The process of establishing the legal and contractual framework for a payment scheme needs to 
build on the development of the institutional framework, definition of the scale of the scheme and 
designation of property rights. This process has to involve all stakeholders engaged in or affected by 
the scheme. This might be done by inviting formal written comments after publication of an official 
draft scheme, or through testing and assessment of the scheme with stakeholders. However, for the 
key stakeholders, decisions on the legal and contractual framework for a scheme must be the subject 
of negotiation (Chapter 4). Negotiation is essential to ensure that the rules for a payment scheme 
incorporate the needs of both buyers and sellers of services, are acceptable to all parties, and are 
therefore sustainable and enforceable. 
“ENSURE THAT THE RULES FOR A PAYMENT SCHEME INCORPORATE 
THE NEEDS OF BOTH BUYERS AND SELLERS.”
Specifying activities and services supplied
Obligations of service sellers can be specified in terms of behaviour or application of defined 
management practices. These should be based on causal relationships with the service provision 
or outcomes desired (Chapter 2.1). Obligations need to be specified relative to a baseline (Chapter 
3.3.2). 
“SPECIFY WHAT ACTIVITIES, SERVICE RESULTS OR OUTCOMES ARE 
CONTRACTED UNDER A PAYMENT SCHEME.”
Photo 5.2 Discussions among stakeholders are critical to reach agreements on payment for watershed services 
(Burkina Faso).
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Alternatively, obligations can be made even more specific and be defined as performance 
requirements. These can be measured against specifically agreed upon targets for service indicators. 
For example, an obligation could be to reach an agreed water quality standard at a certain point of 
measurement by a specified date. However there is a danger with such an approach. Service providers 
might take the required steps to secure service provision, but performance  criteria for services may 
not be met because of circumstances beyond their control. For example, other users not involved in 
the scheme might increase pollution of the river, preventing the  target from being reached despite 
action by participating upstream stakeholders. In such a case, payment cannot be made, and the 
burden of proof in litigation that obligations have been met will rest with the service provider.43 
Thus, great care is needed in specifying what activities, service results or outcomes are contracted 
under a payment scheme. Performance must be measurable and open to proof that can be used as 
legal evidence (Case 12). 
Case 12 Disputed evidence for the impacts of plantation forestry on streamflow 
in South Africa
Streamflow Reduction Activities (SFRA) is a South African water policy instrument that recognises 
water as a limiting resource for development and the need to regulate land uses that consume water. 
Plantation forestry with exotic tree species (e.g. pine and eucalypts) has long been recognised as having 
higher impacts on water resources than native trees. SFRA aims to tax forestry based on quantitative 
reductions in streamflow. However, the forestry sector disputes the hydrological evidence behind new 
and increased charges, because of the complexity of interactions between landscape and hydrology in 
land-use mosaics. As the debate rumbles on, SFRA policy may be simplified to avoid future disputes, bas-
ing SFRA payments on land use instead of hydrological criteria. Liability for SFRA payments would then 
be much more easily assessed, making the policy more acceptable to the forestry sector and the overall 
scheme more effective.
 
Timeframes for payment schemes
The legal and contractual framework for payment schemes must define when and for how long it 
will be in force. Deadlines for compliance with obligations and requirements need to be specified. In 
addition the scheme should aim to create long-term impacts, and thus agreement is needed on steps 
for ensuring the sustainability of the provision of watershed services. The timeframe for a scheme can 
specify that payments will be made for a few years, a few decades, or even forever. Where payments 
are only foreseen for a limited period, then provisions need to be made to guarantee sustainability 
once payments stop. One legal option is to prohibit land-use changes after payments have come 
to an end. Where schemes are established for longer timeframes, financial sustainability has to be 
secured in the long term (Chapter 3.4.2) and there must be scope for adapting the scheme to chang-
ing circumstances. 
Adapting to context
No generic legal and institutional framework can be applied to payment schemes for 
watershed services. Legal arrangements must be adapted to the specific context of the scheme. 
This can be done in two phases. First, at the initial stage when the scheme is being set up, the 
scheme can be tested in the field using pilot schemes to find out more about what works and 
what does not. 
During the second phase, lessons learned from pilot schemes can be used in refining the final 
scheme. The legal framework for the final scheme should include provision for ongoing adaptation 
of the scheme after it has been put in place. Specific circumstances, such as land-use changes, can be 
identified that will result in changes to the obligations and requirements. Further provisions can, for 
example, define a regular timetable for review and revision of the scheme, or specific events that 
would trigger a review, such as instability in the economy. It should be specified further whether 
only certain aspects of the scheme will be reviewed at such times, or whether the whole basis for the 
scheme is subject to review. Even a full re-negotiation of the scheme can be stipulated to ensure that 
the scheme remains equitable after undergoing change. Including such provisions often increases 
trust and the motivation of stakeholders to join.
“LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE ADAPTED TO THE SPECIFIC 
CONTEXT OF THE SCHEME.”
5.3 Ensuring compliance and enforcement
To be credible, rules for payment schemes for watershed services must include measures for 
assessing compliance and enforcement. Compliance is achieved if parties fully implement their 
obligations and requirements under the scheme. Enforcement is the set of actions taken by govern-
ments or intermediaries in response to non-compliance. Effective enforcement supports compliance 
by ensuring fairness for those who willingly comply with their obligations and requirements in a 
scheme.
“RULES FOR PAYMENT SCHEMES MUST INCLUDE MEASURES FOR 
ASSESSING COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT.”
5.3.1 Compliance
By clearly defining the services covered by a scheme, the obligations of stakeholders, perfor-
mance indicators and targets, the legal framework for a payment scheme indirectly describes what 
constitutes compliance. Nevertheless, just how compliance will be determined must be stipulated.44 
Compliance is assessed by monitoring, which can be done through:
•	 Field inspections: Specific, field-level assessments are defined. Exactly what will be inspected 
and what test methods will be used are defined. Inspection procedures are agreed and 
include:	the	legal	authority	for	inspections;	the	frequency	of	inspections;	the	consequences	of	
refusing	 inspection;	rights	of	entry	for	 inspectors;	whether	notification	 is	needed	and	what	
documents may be examined.
•	 Desk reviews: Reports based on self-monitoring and record-keeping by service sellers and 
buyers are monitored. Information in these reports is then used either as a direct basis for 
enforcement actions, or to target inspections. A clearly defined, standard procedure is again 
required, including the method, schedule and format for reporting. Data requirements and 
how long records must be kept must be defined, and whether reports will be made public 
should be agreed.
Aside from these procedural arrangements, there should be clear designation of responsibilities 
for proving compliance or non-compliance. This might be a government agency or another interme-
diary in the payment scheme (Chapter 4). What kinds of evidence can be used to prove compliance 
and what is admissible in a court of law should be determined. 
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Additional procedures need to be defined for how cases of non-compliance will be handled. 
Ideally there will be provisions for using both ‘carrots’ (facilitative measures to enable future compli-
ance) and ‘sticks’ (punitive measures to enforce future compliance). ‘Carrots’ are useful for parties 
who are willing but unable to comply with their obligations. For example, where lack of knowledge 
or inadequate technologies mean land users have difficulty complying, then schemes can support 
improved compliance through training, technical assistance or by arranging access to grants or 
loans.
5.3.2 Enforcement
The underlying cause for non-compliance with a payment scheme in some cases will not result 
from an inability to comply, but rather a lack of willingness to do so. Thus, provisions are needed 
for dealing with deliberate violators who will only change their behaviour if they need to avoid the 
‘stick’ behind a payment scheme. Deterrence relies on two factors:
•	 Credibility,	meaning	that	there	is	a	high	chance	violations	will	be	detected	and	that	responses	
to	violations	will	be	swift	and	predictable;	and
•	 Disincentives	for	non-compliance,	including	appropriate	sanctions.
Powers of enforcement need to be clearly assigned in the legal framework for a payment scheme 
for watershed services. This implies that both formal and informal response mechanisms should be 
specified. Informal responses normally precede formal enforcement actions. Thus, non-complying 
parties are usually given notification that a violation of their obligations and requirements under the 
scheme was found, through a warning letter, telephone call or during inspections. Corrective action 
is specified and a deadline set.
“RESPONSE MECHANISMS TO NON-COMPLIANCE CAN RANGE 
FROM REMEDIAL ACTION TO SANCTIONS.”
If the violation is not corrected within the given timeframe, and if the violation is not successfully 
contested in an appeal or dispute resolution, then formal enforcement action is initiated. One of the 
first penalties that can be applied to service sellers who do not comply with their obligations is with-
holding of regular payments. However, schemes may also specify other responses, such as to failure 
by service buyers to fulfil their obligations. Response mechanisms can range from remedial action to 
sanctions. The specifics of these need to be agreed during negotiation of the rules for the payment 
scheme and embedded in the contractual arrangements. An example of penalties for violation of 
contracts under a payment scheme is shown in Case 13.
Case 13 Sanctions for non-compliance with the watershed protection scheme in 
Pimampiro, Ecuador45
San Pedro de Pimampiro is a municipality located in Imbabura province in Ecuador’s Andean region. The 
municipality	 is	 subject	 to	water	 shortages.	 The	 Ecological	Corporation	 for	 the	Development	of	 Renewable	
Natural	Resources	(CEDERENA),	a	national	NGO,	is	implementing	a	project	to	counteract	environmental	deg-
radation by helping farmers to implement watershed restoration and sustainable forest management. 
As	part	of	this	project,	a	pilot	payment	system	for	watershed	services	is	being	implemented	to	create	incen-
tives for people to conserve forests, and to penalize those who do not. Payments to landowners depend 
on land-cover type. To receive payments, landowners must sign an agreement with the municipality of 
Pimampiro. The agreement establishes a land management plan for the property, specifies the area covered 
and levels of payment according to current land use. Landowners who violate their contracts have their pay-
ments suspended for one quarter. Repeated violations lead to further suspensions and then exclusion from 
the payment scheme. The municipality of Pimampiro and CEDERENA are developing a structured penalty 
system,	but	are	learning	as	the	pilot	project	is	carried	out.	
Remedial action can include imposition of injunctions ordering permanent or temporary shut 
down of specific activities or practices. For example, logging operations in a watershed might be 
halted. Action might be ordered to correct any immediate hazards caused by non-compliance or to 
clean up any environmental damage. Provision might be made for seeking compensation for damage 
suffered because of non-compliance. As the downstream economic damage in a watershed result-
ing from unfulfilled obligations can be severe, it may be advisable to establish a compensation fund 
within the watershed service payment scheme. If a liable party is then unable to pay, the fund can 
then cover the costs of, for example, drinking water pollution or damage to a hydropower plant. 
Such a fund can also be used to reinforce the viability of the payment scheme in the case of extreme 
events, by supporting responses to, for example, severe floods or droughts.
“CRIMINAL SANCTIONS CAN BE IMPOSED IN CASES OF 
SEVERE NEGLIGENCE.”
More punitive sanctions, based on law, may also be foreseen in setting rules for a payment 
scheme. For example, in cases of negligence, penalties such as fines or payment of damages could 
be sought. Criminal sanctions can be imposed in cases of severe negligence or in cases of falsifying 
documents or other fraud. 
Other specific provisions are needed to support enforcement of the payment obligations of 
service buyers. Enforcing payments often requires appealing to court and, consequently, service 
sellers may need funding and legal representation to help them protect their rights. Intermediary 
institutions can play an important role in this context, by supporting service sellers in bringing 
legal action against downstream buyers who are unwilling to fulfil their agreement to pay for 
services delivered.
5.4 Checklist: making the rules
Design an institutional framework for implementation of the scheme
•	 Identify the institutions needed to support implementation and operation of the payment 
scheme.
•	 Utilize	formal	and	informal	institutions	as	appropriate	and	ensure	compatibility	with	custom-
ary law and practices.
•	 Ensure	 that	 the	 institutional	 framework	 is	 appropriate	 to	 the	 legal	 and	wider	 institutional	
context in which the scheme will operate, and to the scale and the extent of public or private 
involvement in the scheme. 
•	 Establish	good	governance	to	build	credibility	and	demonstrate	the	fairness	of	the	payment	
scheme. 
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Clarify land and resource tenure
•	 Ensure clear tenure and property rights. Make sure there is agreement on who has the right 
to derive income from watershed services, who can exclude others from unauthorised use of 
land and resources, who may sell, lease or bequeath these rights, and how customary rights 
are respected.
Clear and enforceable rules and transaction mechanisms are essential
•	 Specify obligations and requirements within a legal and contractual framework for the pay-
ment scheme. Design obligations in ways that make the activities to be performed, or results 
or outcomes to be delivered clear, measurable, practicable, adaptable to change and sustain-
able in the long term.
•	 Utilize	arrangements	for	good	governance	to	support	translation	of	formal	agreements	into	
effective, on-the-ground operation of the payment scheme.
Define and establish compliance and enforcement mechanisms
•	 Agree mechanisms to promote and enforce compliance with obligations under the payment 
scheme. 
•	 Create	comprehensive	procedures	to	verify	compliance	through	inspection	and	reporting.
•	 Incorporate	mechanisms	to	support	compliance	through	training	and	technical	assistance	for	
service providers.
•	 Establish	both	informal	and	formal	enforcement	mechanisms,	including	withholding	of	pay-
ment, remedial actions and sanctions that may result from non-compliance.
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C h a p t e r  6
Learning from Partners and Experience
The building blocks of a payment scheme for watershed services have been laid out in the pre-
ceding chapters. Building and running a successful payment scheme requires putting these pieces 
together in a coherent set of agreements and actions. This demands leadership and management 
of change. Most often, it is project managers in intermediary organizations who face the task of 
coordinating the development of each of these components and of assembling them into a cohesive, 
workable scheme. In doing so, they need to keep focused on creating incentives for water and land 
managers to change their behaviours towards more sustainable use of watershed services. In many 
ways, establishing and managing a payment schemes implies establishing a social learning process. 
In this, stakeholders engage to jointly learn to redefine priorities and reflect upon principles and 
outcomes. 
“ESTABLISHING AND MANAGING A PAYMENT SCHEME IMPLIES 
ESTABLISHING A SOCIAL LEARNING PROCESS.”
6.1 Payment schemes and social learning
6.1.1 Coordinating implementation and social learning 
Chapters 2 to 5 laid out the elements of strategy needed in developing a payment scheme for 
watershed services (see Figure 1.2). Sound project management is vital, to ensure effective coordi-
nation between components. Project managers need to be supported by multi-disciplinary teams 
combining hydrological, ecological, economic, legal and social expertise and know how. Excellent 
communication among team members is needed to ensure that analyses under one component are 
shared with all other components. Moreover, the information and knowledge assembled has to be 
brought together and used by stakeholders for learning. Project managers need to ensure that this 
is done in a timely way to ensure that learning and decision-making  proceeds as the evidence base 
for the scheme accumulates. Therefore, a critical task in coordinating development of a payment 
scheme is to establish an effective, transparent social learning process. This must enable meaningful 
and well-informed participation by stakeholders in setting up and running the payment scheme.
“SOUND PROJECT MANAGEMENT IS VITAL, TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE 
COORDINATION BETWEEN COMPONENTS.”
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Figure 6.1 Setting up and running a payment scheme requires social learning among 
stakeholders.
 
6.1.2 The learning cycle
A strategy for developing and running payment scheme can be broken down into a series of 
discrete elements that together form a learning cycle (Figure 6.1). This plan-act-review cycle has four 
key elements: 
Step 1. Setting up
During this phase, an initial situation analysis is carried out. These combine the assessment of 
watershed services (Chapter 2.1), stakeholder analysis (Chapter 4.2), institutional analysis (Chapter 
4.3.1) and power analysis (Chapter 4.3.2). These analyses help to deepen understanding of the 
situation within the watershed and to establish a baseline against which future progress can be mea-
sured. Initial steps are undertaken to build stakeholder support and communicate about watershed 
services, their values and options for improving their management. 
In this early stage, one would establish an interim steering group that can help to galvanize 
stakeholder support for the process. This group would have the task of outlining the general process, 
the timeframe, institutional requirements and the resources needed to arrive at an agreement. It 
can also be responsible for establishing early ideas about the scope, mandate and expectations of a 
payment scheme for watershed services. 
Step 2. Planning strategically
Moving from the initial step, the interim steering group needs to work on building understand-
ing among stakeholders (potential buyers and sellers). Stakeholders should know about each other’s 
values, motivations, reservations, concerns and interests. At this stage, those taking part should be 
able to establish a common vision for the watershed and its services. 
Creating a vision needs to go hand in hand with the identification of issues, challenges and 
opportunities. As indicated in Chapter 3.3, stakeholders need to examine future scenarios and 
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options. Based on these, the parties need to agree on a common strategy and set objectives for a 
payment scheme. This needs to be elaborated through the identification of actions, timeframes and 
responsibilities. Finally, the various elements of the payment scheme must be laid down in a contrac-
tual arrangement (Chapter 5.2). As in the previous stage, it is important to communicate frequently 
to ensure transparency and build trust among parties.
Step 3. Implementation and management
During this stage, the parties move to implementation of the agreed scheme. A formalized steer-
ing group (or other coordination mechanism) is set-up and embedded in wider existing institutional 
arrangements. The management structures and procedures required for the running the scheme are 
also put in place. Resources needed to run the scheme are secured from the buyers, sellers and third 
parties if required. 
Close working relationships among stakeholders continue. These may facilitate developing 
the capacities of specific stakeholders to implement agreed actions. This implies regular meetings 
between buyers and sellers to continue to familiarize each with the others’ situation. Using these 
processes to maintain the commitment of stakeholders to the scheme is important, especially as there 
may be a time lag before results appear. 
Step 4. Evaluation and reflection
As payments schemes for watershed services are a significant innovation, it is unlikely that the 
first design and pilots will all be successful. Therefore, it is important to establish a learning culture 
and environment. This allows stakeholders to share experiences, questions and information relevant 
to the development and implementation of the scheme. 
In the contract, specific obligations and performance standards should have been defined 
(Chapter 5.2.2). These could either relate to actions taken, results produced or outcomes and impacts 
achieved. What is needed now are practical approaches for monitoring the compliance of the parties 
and the performance of the scheme in relation to the obligations agreed. This should be based on 
periodic reviews and discussion of the results with stakeholders. Lessons learned provide feedback 
into the strategies, implementation procedures and the day-to-day management of the scheme.
6.2 Turning the learning cycle
Two particular sets of activities during development and implementation of a payment scheme 
are especially relevant to learning. These are the key opportunities for synthesizing and reviewing 
knowledge and information relating to the watershed and payment scheme. First, there are fea-
sibility assessments, when existing knowledge and emerging new information are synthesized for 
perhaps the first time. Stakeholders can use such early opportunities for review as a platform for 
better planning and implementation of the scheme. Second, there is the monitoring and evalua-
tion of the implementation of the scheme. Reflection on results from monitoring and evaluation 
by stakeholders is a vital part of social learning in a payment scheme. These processes sit at the 
heart of step 4 in the learning cycle.
“REFLECTION ON RESULTS FROM MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
BY STAKEHOLDERS IS A VITAL PART OF SOCIAL LEARNING IN A 
PAYMENT SCHEME.”
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6.2.1 Feasibility studies and learning
One of the first questions that needs to be answered in relation to the feasibility of a payment 
scheme is: will payments work? Will payment (or in-kind rewards) provide the incentive needed to 
for upstream landholders to change to preferred choices for land use and management? 
Scenario analysis can be used to find answers. It is used to test the adoption of changes in land 
management by stakeholder groups under alternative types of incentives. Responses to alternative 
scenarios are surveyed or explored in focus groups. Differences in preferences among stakeholder 
groups can then highlight what other issues need to be tackled for incentives to take effect. For 
example, in the Bhoj wetland in India, scenario analysis was used to test the likely effectiveness of 
making payments to farmers to support conversion to organic farming and reduced wetland pol-
lution. Results showed that payments were only likely to promote the desired outcomes if there 
was institutional support for training of farmers and for accessing premium markets. Thus, scenario 
analysis is a valuable tool for understanding, at an early stage, the scope of action needed to make 
a payment scheme effective.
“SCENARIO ANALYSIS IS A VALUABLE TOOL FOR UNDERSTANDING 
THE SCOPE OF ACTION NEEDED.”
Feasibility studies are done later, as detailed knowledge accumulates. They are used to syn-
thesize and review the diverse data and information gathered on watershed services, their values, 
finance needs, stakeholders, institutions and legal issues. The purpose is to assess the economic 
viability of a proposed scheme and therefore support planning of the payment scheme. Feasibility 
studies should:
•	 Raise	 awareness	 about	watershed	 services,	 their	 values	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 payment	 for	
these services.
•	 Review	alternative	approaches	to	addressing	watershed	problems,	including	doing	nothing.
•	 Identify	issues	that	could	influence	the	success	or	failure	of	a	payment	scheme.
•	 Identify	potential	buyers,	sellers,	intermediaries	and	specialist	support.
•	 Understand	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	for	various	scheme	options.
•	 Assess	sources	of	funding	for	transactions	and	administration	of	the	scheme.
•	 Identify	options	for	management	of	the	scheme	and	institutional	and	legal	issues.
•	 Weigh	up	the	potential	economic,	social	and	environmental	impacts	of	alternative	solutions	
and rank alternatives according to their feasibility and anticipated outcomes.
The feasibility assessment is useful for marshalling political and financial support for a proposed 
payment scheme. The cost of the assessment and time needed vary with scale and data requirements. 
Six months might be adequate for a smaller scheme where most data already exists, but perhaps 
three years will be needed for large schemes or if large amounts of new data need to be collected.
“FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT IS USEFUL FOR MARSHALLING 
POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT.”
After the feasibility assessment, pilot schemes might be set up. They are another opportunity to 
undertake further cycles of planning, acting and reviewing before moving to full-scale implementa-
tion. Pilot schemes can be run for a limited time in a sub-catchment of a larger basin where the full 
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scheme will be implemented. Alternatively, pilots may be run for only a simplified set of objectives 
relating to a sub-set of the watershed service included in the full scheme. The aim of a pilot phase 
should be to test both the management of the scheme and its impacts. Testing of impacts is done 
through monitoring key-indicators and evaluating the results. Reflection on the results and impacts 
of pilot schemes are thus an opportunity to refine plans for implementation of the full scheme.
6.2.2 Monitoring and evaluation
The learning cycle should not end with the launch of a payment scheme. Monitoring and evalu-
ating the impacts of actions is a critical mechanism for review of projects and hence learning. As 
implementation of a payment scheme proceeds, tracking key environmental and social indicators is 
used by managers and stakeholders to determine if a scheme and the participating parties are doing 
what they set out to do. Where gaps or failings are identified, results from monitoring are used to 
adapt the scheme through the learning cycle. If serious underperformance is recorded, consideration 
might be given to altering the design of the scheme and changing the contractual arrangements 
accordingly.
Evaluation of a payment scheme in Costa Rica assessed environmental and social impacts of the 
scheme (Case 14). The study concluded that the scheme was creating environmental benefits, but 
was not benefiting the poor. 
“MONITORING AND EVALUATING THE IMPACTS OF ACTIONS IS 
CRITICAL FOR LEARNING.”
Case 14 Impacts of a payment scheme on farmers in Virilla watershed, 
Costa Rica46 
The Payments for Environmental Services programme in Costa Rica was set up in 1995 to encourage forest pro-
tection and management by paying forest owners for carbon, biodiversity, landscape and watershed services 
provided by their forests. Impacts of schemes run under this programme in the Virilla watershed were evalu-
ated. The study found that landowners in the watershed were relatively wealthy and well educated, and that 
most participants were not dependant on the land for their livelihood. Landowners identified a range of ben-
efits from the scheme. These included environmental benefits such as reduced land degradation and improved 
water quality. For some the economic benefits in the form of the payments were important. Additional benefits 
were access to training and technical support and opportunities to start eco-tourism ventures.
The study also found that poorer households were often excluded from the scheme. First, households receiving 
government welfare benefits were not entitled to participate. Second, it was difficult for smaller-scale farmers 
to set aside forest area on the farm. While the scheme was creating environmental benefits, therefore, under 
the existing arrangements, the scheme was not supporting poverty alleviation. 
Monitoring and evaluating outcomes helps scheme managers to adapt to changes in the water-
shed and in the wider social and economic environment. Results from monitoring and evaluation 
studies can be used to learn lessons and build the capacities of buyers and sellers. For example, 
monitoring and evaluation might identify training and support needs for enhancing the quality of 
the activities, the results achieved and the outcome or impacts attained.
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Learning was the key to adaptation of watershed management in Case 15, from India. Cycles of 
planning, acting and review have seen the scheme change in response to the needs of stakeholders.
Case 15 Adaptive participatory watershed management in the village of 
Sukhomajiri, India 47 
In	the	1970s,	residents	living	in	Chandigarh,	downstream	of	the	village	of	Sukhomajiri,	were	severely	affected	
by	water	scarcity	caused	by	siltation	of	Lake	Sukhna.	Assessments	found	that	Sukhomajiri	was	the	cause	of	
a large share of the sediment load. In response, a water users association was set up in Chandigarh in 1982 
to collect fees from water users and fund infrastructure improvements and investment in watershed manage-
ment.	To	secure	the	support	and	participation	of	Sukhomajiri,	funds	were	provided	to	construct	a	reservoir	for	
irrigation	in	Sukhomajiri.
Landowners below the reservoir benefited from increased water for irrigation, but landless individuals depend-
ing on common lands above the reservoir found that their access to grazing was restricted. To gain additional 
support for watershed protection from landless households, the water users association introduced a benefits 
sharing system. A tradable water rights scheme was introduced, where every household was awarded the same 
right to water. Those with no use for irrigation water (such as the landless) were then able to sell their rights 
to others, to provide financial reward for complying with watershed protection.
However, fluctuations in water availability made the system of water rights difficult to maintain. 
The scheme was therefore adapted again. The water user association returned to collection of fees 
from water users for watershed protection. However, one of the aims of the scheme became to 
employ landless people to implement watershed protection, thereby providing another incentive to 
gain their support.
Planning for monitoring and evaluation should take place during the design and negotiation 
of a payment scheme. This requires a clear definition of:
•	 The	financial	and	human	resources	required.
•	 The	key	indicators	used.
•	 A	data	collection	strategy.
•	 A	reporting	format	and	strategy.	
•	 A	procedure	for	using	the	monitoring	results.
The budget required to monitor and evaluate a payment scheme is likely to be proportional 
to the scale of the scheme and the total funding. For example, evaluation costs for seven World 
Bank impact evaluations were between US$ 200,000 and US$ 900,000, representing 0.20 - 1.25% 
of total project costs.48 Such figures are beyond what can be afforded by smaller projects working, 
for example, in sub-catchments. They may have to spend 5-10% of their funds on monitoring and 
evaluating their scheme. However, this may be a wise investment. Good monitoring of actions and 
downstream responses provides a strong evidence base compared to descriptive anecdotes only. 
Buyers, sellers and third-party sponsors or donors are much more likely to support schemes if pilot 
schemes where properly monitored and showed real downstream impacts.
“GOOD MONITORING OF ACTIONS AND DOWNSTREAM 
RESPONSES PROVIDES A STRONG EVIDENCE BASE.”
90
91
The timing of evaluations is important. Planning for an evaluation should consider the level of 
monitoring carried out, the purpose of the evaluation and when the results are needed. With good 
timing, results can be used for overcoming key obstacles, preparing for new funding cycles or as an 
input into a policy process. 
The amount of time required depends on whether monitoring is done to confirm that actions 
have been taken, results have been achieved or impacts have materialized. Seeing evidence at the 
impact level may take many years. This is particularly true for social impacts, for example on health or 
education. Assessment of impacts on natural resources needs to account for variability, for example 
between wet and dry years. Hence, evaluations may have to be carried out over more than one 
year or drought-wet cycle.
“SEEING EVIDENCE AT THE IMPACT LEVEL MAY TAKE 
MANY YEARS.”
The objectives of monitoring should be clearly defined. Targets for key indicators should guide 
the evaluation of performance at the action, results and impact level. Deciding which indicators 
to use in an evaluation is thus a key step. It should be done through a consultative process and be 
included in negotiating a payment schemes and be formalized in the agreement. Ensuring that all 
stakeholders understand and agree with how success will be monitored and judged will increase 
trust and confidence in the scheme.
Photo 6.1 Assessments of freshwater fauna helps to establish baselines against which to monitor progress (Pan-
gani Basin, Tanzania).
Data collected for monitoring should include measures of:
•	 Delivery	of	actions agreed among buyers and sellers. 
•	 Compliance	with	agreed	results, such as changes in land use or management (or agreed reten-
tion of current land uses), and payments by service buyers. 
•	 Impacts on the delivery of watershed services and their distribution.
A challenge for many payment schemes is being able to distinguish the impacts of a payment 
scheme from other, correlated impacts that are caused by other factors. To overcome this, a control 
area can, ideally, be used for comparison. The control area should be almost identical to the tar-
geted area. For example, impacts of a payment scheme might be compared between two groups 
of farmers located in different sub-catchments. Each should have similar economic, agro-climatic 
and land management characteristics, but one participates in the payment scheme and the other 
does not. The two groups might be in nearby sub-catchments with the payment scheme operating 
in one but not the other.
Estimating impacts requires sampling of indicators for the groups and locations considered in the 
evaluation. Sampling should combine comparison of participating and non-participating groups with 
‘before-and-after’ measures. Thus, establishing baselines for key-indicators prior to implementation 
of a payment scheme is critical. Methods for data collection combine biophysical measurement with 
quantitative and qualitative survey methods from social research.49 Specialist expertise is therefore 
usually needed to design and analyse an evaluation.
“SOCIAL LEARNING WILL REMAIN A CRITICAL ASPECT OF 
DEVELOPING SUCCESSFUL PAYMENTS SCHEMES.”
Payments for watershed services are an important innovation in water management. Innovations 
do not come without carefully assessing how useful and acceptable they are to stakeholders. As this 
innovation is rapidly developing into a mainstream tool for water managers, more people need to 
become aware of the way to develop and run these schemes. Social learning will remain a critical 
aspect of developing successful payments schemes in the future, as we are ‘learning’ by doing how 
to manage the environment more sustainably. 
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Glossary
Additionality 
The action of impacts that would not have occurred without an intervention. 
Bequest value
A component of Total Economic Value: a non-use value derived from the desire to pass on 
natural resources and ecosystems to future generations. 
Cap / Regulatory cap
A maximum level, for example of pollutant loads, that is mandated by law.
Cap-and-trade schemes
Watershed services payment schemes in which aggregate levels (caps) are determined, for 
example, for the release of pollutants, and then the right to release pollutants is traded among 
participating entities. 
Certification schemes 
Watershed services payment schemes in which payments are embedded in the premium price paid 
for a certified traded product. 
Corrective actions
Actions intended to correct or counteract something that is malfunctioning, undesirable, or 
injurious. Corrective action is also sometimes used as an encompassing term that includes 
remedial actions, genuine corrective actions and preventive actions.
Crowding out
When government expenditures or actions result in a decline of similar private sector spending or actions. 
Customary law or rights
The written and unwritten rules and rights which have developed from the customs and 
traditions of communities. 
Development rights
Legal rights to use, develop or profit from land or resources owned by another, generally 
synonymous with usufruct rights.
Direct-use value
A component of Total Economic Value: environmental and natural resources that are used directly 
as raw materials and physical products for production, consumption and sale. 
Ecosystem services 
The benefits that people receive from ecosystems. 
Existence value
A component of Total Economic Value: the intrinsic value of environmental or natural resources, 
regardless of their current or future use possibilities.
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Externalities / Externality costs
Economic side-effects. Costs or benefits arising from an economic activity that affect somebody other 
than the people engaged in the activity, and which are generally not taken into account in decision-
making.
Feasibility studies
A preliminary study undertaken to ascertain the likelihood of a project’s success, generally including 
assessments of technical and financial viability.
Fiscal 
Relating to government taxation, spending, or financial matters.
Fiscal mechanisms
Financial tools used by the government to affect economic behaviour, for example taxes, 
subsidies or direct spending.
Governance
The exercise of political authority and the use of institutional resources to manage society’s problems 
and affairs.
Indirect-use value
A component of Total Economic Value: environmental services which maintain and protect 
natural and human systems.
Institutional analysis
Identifies how institutions influence buyers and sellers of watershed services, and changes 
needed for a payment scheme to succeed.
Institutions
Institutions can refer, narrowly, to specific organizations – or, more broadly, to the policies, rules, 
incentives, customs and practices that govern social relations. 
Infrastructure
The basic physical structures and services – both man-made and natural – that are needed for the 
functioning of a community or society.
Micro-catchments 
A watershed area usually used to describe a smaller part of a river basin draining into a 
tributary stream. Similar to sub-catchments.
Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E): Monitoring focuses on tracking inputs, outputs, outcomes and 
impacts as interventions are implemented. Evaluation assesses the efficiency and impact of inter-
ventions (typically after they have been implemented). Together M&E allows policy-makers to track 
results, suggest corrections or improvements during implementation, and assess success. 
Marginal cost
The change in cost associated with producing one additional unit of a good or service. 
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Non-point source pollution 
Pollution from many diffuse sources, for example when runoff moves over and through the ground 
carrying natural and human-made pollutants into lakes, rivers, wetlands and coastal waters.
Non-use values
A component of Total Economic Value: values that derive from the benefits of the environment but 
do not involve using it in any way, either directly or indirectly. 
Opportunity cost 
The value to the economy of a good, service or resource in its next best alternative use.
Option value
A component of Total Economic Value: the premium placed on maintaining environmental or natu-
ral resources for future possible uses, over and above the direct or indirect value of these uses. 
Payment schemes
Arrangements for payments between buyers and sellers of goods or services. 
Payment for environmental services (PES)
Market-based approaches using payments or rewards to encourage or discourage specific 
practices in natural resources management. 
Perverse incentives
Incentives that undermine or lead to the opposite of the desired result.
Point source pollution 
Pollution released at specific identifiable sites, for example from factories or sewage outlets.
Power analysis
Relates the power of different stakeholders to their potential to control implementation or be 
affected by a payment scheme.
Private payment schemes
PES schemes in which agreements are made between private entities to provide payments or 
rewards in return for maintenance or restoration of ecosystem services. 
Property rights
Legal ownership rights to land or resources.
Public payment schemes
PES schemes in which government entities compel changes in environmental management through a 
variety of (fiscal) payment mechanisms including user fees, land purchases, taxes and subsidies. 
Remedial action 
Actions taken to remedy or correct a situation, to return something to its previous or proper state.
River basin
A watershed area usually used to describe a large land area that drains into a major river.
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Scenario analysis
A process of analyzing possible future events by considering alternative possible outcomes or scenarios.
Social learning 
A learning process in which stakeholders engage to learn jointly to redefine priorities and reflect 
upon principles and outcomes.
Sub-catchments
A watershed area usually used to describe a smaller part of a river basin draining into a 
tributary stream. Similar to micro-catchments. 
Subsidies 
Monetary grants given by a government to lower the price faced by producers or consumers of 
a good, generally because it is considered to be in the public interest. A subsidy is essentially the 
opposite of a tax.
Taxes
Financial charges or other levies imposed on an individual or corporation by a government. 
Also known as ‘duties’.
Tenure rights
The legal regime in which land is owned by an individual, who is said to ‘hold’ the land.
Total Economic Value 
The sum of all marketed and non-marketed benefits associated with an ecosystem or 
environmental resource, including direct, indirect, option and existence values. 
Transaction costs
The costs that arise in the process of trading with others, on top of the price of the good or 
service exchanged. 
Use values 
A component of Total Economic Value: value derived from direct use, indirect use and options values 
associated with natural resources or ecosystems.
Usufruct rights
The right to use property or generate income from property that is owned by another. 
Watershed 
An area of land that feeds water to a river, draining through the landscape into tributaries and main 
river channels. Also called ‘catchments’, ‘drainage basins’ or ‘river basins.’
Watershed services
The benefits people obtain from ecosystems within a watershed. 
Willingness to pay
The amount a consumer will agree to pay for a particular good or service – often used as a proxy 
for its value.
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Pay – Establishing payments for watershed services
Payments for watershed services is an emerging innovation in water management. This guide offers 
a hands-on explanation of the issues that need to be addressed when establishing these payment 
schemes. It explains what watershed services are and what their value is. It then highlights the 
technical, financial, legal and social aspects of establishing payments schemes for maintaining or 
restoring watershed services critical for downstream water security.
About IUCN
IUCN, the International Union for Conservation of Nature brings together States, government agen-
cies, and a diverse range of non-governmental organisations in a unique partnership. As a Union of 
members, IUCN seeks to influence, encourage and assist societies around the world to conserve the 
integrity and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable and 
ecologically sustainable. 
www.iucn.org
About the IUCN Water and Nature Initiative
The IUCN Water and Nature Initiative is an action programme to demonstrate that ecosystem-based 
management and stakeholder participation will help to solve the water dilemma of today – bringing 
rivers back to life and maintaining the resource base for many.
www.waterandnature.org
